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En analysant les processus dialectiques par lesquels l’art repense le passé, Between Truth and 
Trauma : The Work of Art and Memory work in Adorno traite du concept adornien de la 
mémoire. Je postule que l’œuvre d’art chez Adorno incarne un Zeitkern (noyau temporel). Je 
démontrerai que l’immanence réciproque de l’histoire dans l’œuvre d’art et l’immanence de 
l’œuvre d’art dans l’histoire permettent de repenser le passé. Le premier chapitre examine la 
manière par laquelle le passé est préservé et nié par l’œuvre d’art. Le deuxième chapitre 
montre comment, à l’aide du processus interprétatif, le passé est transcendé à travers l’œuvre 
d’art. Le dernier chapitre évoque la lecture adornienne d’écrits de Brecht et de Beckett dans 
le but d’illustrer la capacité de l’œuvre d’art à naviguer entre la vérité et le trauma. 
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Analyzing the dialectical processes through which art works through the past, Between Truth 
and Trauma: The Work of Art and Memory in Adorno examines Adorno’s concept of memory. I 
argue that, for Adorno, the work of art both has and is a Zeitkern (temporal nucleus). I 
demonstrate that the reciprocal immanence of history in the work and immanence of the 
work in history allows for the past to be worked through. The first chapter examines how 
the past is preserved and negated by the work of art. The second chapter examines how the 
past is transcended through the work of art via the interpretive process. The final chapter 
looks at Adorno’s reading of work by Beckett and Brecht in order to illustrate the ability of 
the work of art to navigate between truth and trauma. 
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Among the many problems with which philosophy actively engages, one problem 
meriting more attention is the problem of memory. Memory is linked with 
philosophy’s ultimate love of wisdom and quest for truth. For example, philosophers 
as disparate as Plato and Martin Heidegger have characterized the process of 
uncovering truth as the process of un-forgetting.1 Philosophy, considered within this 
conception, has a role to play in the process of un-forgetting, or memory. What is the 
role of philosophy in remembering? What exactly is philosophy trying to uncover and 
remember? How does memory relate to truth?  
 
Both memory and truth are temporal phenomena. If Hegel was the first modern 
thinker to rediscover the temporal and historical nature of the truth2 then it was his 
successors, such as Theodor Adorno, who gave philosophy the task of trying to 
recover historical truth. This recovery does not try to return truth to its particular 
context, as in historiography, but rather to uncover its contemporary presence. 
Uncovering temporal presence is the fundamental objective of memory. Memory and 
historical truth converge in the concept of temporal presence. 
 
                                                
1 In Greek mythology forgetfulness is represented by the underworld river Lethe. Lethe plays a 
prominent role in various philosophies, perhaps most notably in Book X of Plato’s Republic, in the 
Myth of Er, when the souls about to be reincarnated or transmigrated drink from it on their way back 
up to their next lives. Plato, Republic, trans. G.M.A. Grube, (Indianapolis: Hackett Publishing Company, 
1992), 621a. Lethe, as Heidegger points out, means concealment: “Λήθη, oblivion, is a concealment 
that withdraws what is essential and alienates man from himself, i.e., form the possibility of dwelling 
within his own essence.” Martin Heidegger, Parmenedies, trans. A. Schuwer & R. Rojcewicz, 
(Indianapolis: Indianapolis University Press, 1992), 72. ἀλήθεια, the Greek word for truth, implies an 
unconcealedness. 
2 Theodor W. Adorno, Aesthetic Theory, trans. R. Hullot-Kentor, (Minneapolis: University of Minnesota 
Press, 1997), 32. See also when Adorno writes about how Hegel exploded the notion eternal truth: 
“[…] philosophy is its own time comprehended in thought.” Theodor W. Adorno, Critical Models, 
Interventions and Catchwords, trans. H. Pickford, (New York: Columbia University Press, 1998), 15. 
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Much of 19th and 20th century theory and art was devoted to understanding the 
question of temporal presence. Marcel Proust’s search for lost time amidst the 
madeleines and the bells is perhaps the best example. However, phenomenologists, 
critical theorists, cultural critics, and artists alike have all been drawn towards the 
riddle of Proust’s pyramid of past life.3 In this pyramid, nothing is ever consumed by 
utter oblivion. The past lingers in the unconscious as well as in the world of sensuous 
objects and images. The riddle asks: how does the unconscious become conscious? 
What does it mean when it does? What happens if it does not? Perhaps most 
importantly, what is the nature of our responsibility in this process?  
 
The solution to this riddle lies in understanding memory. Rising to prominence in the 
1990s, Memory Studies occupies a huge space in both academic and popular 
discourse. As the 20th century slipped away, and as borders, once thought forever 
locked, opened up, the availability of previously classified information stoked the fires 
of end of century (and millennium) malaise. The simultaneous ability and drive to re-
conceive our relationship to the past is perhaps one of the reasons why discussions 
about memory became so ubiquitous. Poised at the nostalgic end of an era precipice, 
the notion of how to move forward and what to take with us in this move becomes 
important.  
 
No thinker has been more emphatic regarding the ethical imperatives and duties that 
we have in response to the barbarism of the 20th century than Adorno. There is a 
                                                
3 See Merleau-Ponty’s description of the lived body as a sedimentary cogito that is perched on Proust’s 
pyramid of past life. He gives the example of a middle class man turned workman who will always be the 
middle class man who turned workman. Maurice Merleau-Ponty, The Phenomenology of Perception, trans. C. 
Smith, (New York: Routledge Classic, 2002), 457-458. 
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sense of urgency in Adorno’s work that appears most poignantly in his need to re-
locate and strengthen the subject in order to fight administered society and the culture 
industry, and to awaken consciousness from its reified slumber. This sense of urgency 
is heightened because the contemporary subject must contend with the presence of 
the past of the 20th century. Adorno’s concern regarding the presence of the past 
relates to what he saw as the failure to collectively work through the Holocaust. In his 
essay, The Meaning of Working Through the Past, possibly where he most clearly and 
colloquially addresses the question of responsibility towards the past, Adorno states 
that the past cannot be worked through until its objective conditions are dealt with: 
That fascism lives on, that the oft-invoked working through of the past has to 
this day been unsuccessful and has degenerated into its own caricature, an empty 
and cold forgetting, is due to the fact that the objective conditions of society 
that engendered fascism continue to exist.4  
 
Adorno attributes the failure to contend with the presence of the past to both 
collective and individual repression, repetition, and persistent prejudice. Certainly, 
philosophy has something to say about these problems that is important both for 
philosophy and for the general discourse on the matter. But more particularly, I 
think that Adorno has something very significant to say about memory, in spite of 
his never having worked out something like a ‘theory of memory’. It is perhaps for 
this reason that there has yet to be an extensive study of Adorno’s concept of 
memory. 
 
As Adorno’s concept of memory is both elusive and omnipresent in his work, my 
long-term project is to piece it together by merging the various fragments he gives us 
                                                
4 Adorno, Critical Models, p. 98. Given that objective conditions are hard to change, it becomes very 
important to free the subject from its total implication in the collective. See for example, Adorno, 
Critical Models, 192-193 or Adorno’s description of the authoritarian personality, Critical Models, 198-199.  
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in his more essayistic work with the more densely philosophical texts. On a very basic 
level, memory for Adorno is dialectical. This implies that the past is worked through 
(Aufarbeitung) by sublation (Aufhebung). Memory as the sublation of the past is a 
transcendence of the past via a process of simultaneous negation and preservation. 
Adorno’s conception of memory as an active and dialectical working through of the 
presence of the past in the present poses a challenge to other discourses where 
remembering treats the past as something to be preserved (via monuments and 
memorials etc), negated (forgotten) or transcended (gotten over at whatever cost). For 
Adorno, only the simultaneous working of all three processes ensures that memory is 
more than a return to barbarism.  
 
Within the context of Adorno’s conception of memory work, two main questions 
emerge: first, how does the past manifest itself in the present (how is it preserved and 
negated)? Second, how is the past recognized in the present and ultimately 
transcended? I will argue that for Adorno, the active living past5 appears in the 
present through ciphers, or dialectical images, conflating the temporal distance 
between present and past. Language, art, and cultural items, when interpreted as 
dialectical images, reveal the concealed past.6 Thus in order to truly work through the 
                                                
5 Like other thinkers within the dialectical materialist tradition, the past has a sort of life in the present 
as it is suspended in a manner that invokes a simultaneous return of the same as well as a frozenness. 
For example see Benjamin’s notion of Jetztzeit, from his essay Theses on the Philosophy of History, and the 
present as that “[…] in which time stands still […].” Walter Benjamin, Illuminations, ed. H. Arendt, 
(New York: Schocken Books, 1969), 261-262. Another example comes from the Arcades Project where 
Benjamin states that the image is where the past and present come together to form a constellation. 
Walter Benjamin, The Arcades Project, trans. H. Eiland & K. McLaughlin, (Cambridge, Massachusetts: 
The Belknap Press of Harvard University Press, 1999), 463. He also describes the historical materialist 
take on temporality as the “[t]elescoping of the past through the present.” Benjamin, Arcades Project, 471 
6 For a clear and thoughtful discussion of images in Adorno’s work see Richter’s Thought Images and the 
Frankfurt School Writers’ Reflections from Damaged Life. He writes that: “[t]he image records an historical 
moment at the same time that it interrupts history, perpetuating the very thinkability of history even as 
it breaks with the logic of historical unfolding.” Gerhard Richter, Thought Images and the Frankfurt School 
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past, its way of underpinning the present must be rendered visible. Memory, for 
Adorno, can be conceived as a process of deciphering this living presence of the past. 
This deciphering constitutes a form of philosophical work. This philosophical work 
can be considered to be a sort of archaeology or excavation of these dialectical 
images.  
 
The concept of the dialectical image is a key to understanding the relationship 
between the work of art and memory in the Adornian context. Conceiving of an 
image as dialectical suggests that the image, whether it is a work of art, a word, or 
cultural item, sublates the past. Two key processes must take place: first, the image 
preserves the past via negation, and second, the image allows the past to be 
transcended through it. The image marks a caesura: time stands still in the image. 
However, the image is also an impetus for interpretive movement. 
 
                                                
Writers’ Reflections from Damaged Life, (Stanford: Stanford University Press, 2007), 107. Richter performs a 
clear and lucid analysis of Benjamin, Bloch, Kracauer, and Adorno’s use of images in their writing. 
While dialectical images and thought-images (Denkbilder) are not the same concept, I would propose 
that the dialectical image is a sort of thought-image. On the dedication page of his book, Richter cites 
Adorno: “Thought-images (Denkbilder) are not images like the Platonic myths of the cave or the 
chariot. Rather, they are scribbled picture-puzzles, parabolic evocations of something that cannot be 
said in words (des in Worten Unsagbaren). They do not want to stop conceptual thought so much as to 
shock through their enigmatic form and thereby get thought moving, because thought in its traditional 
conceptual form seems rigid, conventional, and outmoded.” The citation comes from Adorno’s writing 
on Benjamin’s One Way Street in his Notes to Literature. Richter states that because the Denkbilder were 
fragmentary, explosive, and decentering, they helped the thinkers of the Frankfurt School in their “[…] 
struggle against the reactionary modes of cultural and political coordination that constituted the so-
called conservative revolution in Germany in the 1920s and 1930s […]” Richter, Thought Images, 8. The 
images also perform two very important functions, they express what cannot be said (Richter, Thought 
Images, 13), and they read the world as though it was a text (Richter, Thought Images, 18). Finally, the idea 
of the image plays with the notion of presence and absence, and thus participates in a sort of Aufhebung 
by simultaneously preserving and negating their socio-historical reality (Richter, Thought Images, 108). 
Excavating, creating, and interpreting these images allowed the thinkers to be connected to and critical 
of the lingering presence of the 19th century. 
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The dialectical image is a cipher of social reality7 or a riddle containing the presence of the 
past. Deciphering this riddle is, for Adorno, how the past it is to be worked through.8 
The idea of the dialectical image most likely originated with Benjamin’s failed 
habilitation: The Origins of German Tragic Drama. Adorno borrows this concept, and 
uses the word dialectical image in his early work Kierkegaard Construction of the Aesthetic 
when discussing the relationship between dialectic, myth and image. He writes:  
Dialectic comes to a stop in the image and cites the mythical in the historically 
most recent as the distant past: nature as proto-history. For this reason the 
images, which like those of the intérieur bring dialectic and myth to the point of 
indifferentiation, are truly ‘antediluvian fossils,’ They may be called dialectical 
images, to use Benjamin’s expression, whose compelling definition ‘in allegory 
the observer is confronted with the facies hippocratia of history, a petrified 
primordial landscape’9  
 
For Benjamin, history breaks down into images.10 The image is a particular fragment 
or trace of an epoch that is imbued with the universal socio-historical condition of the 
epoch.11 Benjamin describes these images as fossils, and the landscape as petrified and 
primordial, thus evoking the notion of a past whose immanent presence is experienced 
in both the minutiae and totality of what is left behind. These dialectical images are 
mimetic translations, transformations, and authentic replications of social reality 
because they are part of a social reality.  
 
                                                
7 Susan Buck-Morrs, Origin of Negative Dialectics, Theodor W. Adorno, Walter Benjamin and the Frankfurt 
Institute, (New York: The Free Press, 1977), 97. 
8 Ibid, 97. Buck-Morss also argues that Benjamin’s dialecital images are where thesis and antithesis converge 
and where reified objects are set in motion. See Buck-Morss, Origin of Negative Dialectics, 106.  
9 Theodor W. Adorno, Kierkegaard Construction of the Aesthetic, trans. R. Hullot-Kentor, (Minneapolis: 
University of Minnesota Press, 1989), 54. See also Adorno, Critical Models, 160. Benjamin cites this 
passage in Konvolut N (On the Theory of Knowledge, Theory of Progress) of the Arcades Project, 461. 
10 Benjamin, Arcades Project, 476. This is cited in Susan Buck-Morss, Dreamworld and Catastrophe, The 
Passing of Mass Utopia in East and West, (Cambridge, Massachusetts: The MIT Press, 2000), 68-69. 
11 Buck-Morss, The Origin of Negative Dialectics, 102-104.  
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However, the concept of the dialectical image differs in Benjamin and Adorno. 
Adorno sometimes prefers the term historical image, a term he introduced in his early 
writings on nature-history.12 Susan Buck-Morss suggests that Adorno chose to 
describe these images as historical in order to ensure that they were to be understood 
objectively due to their socio-historical specificity and not psychologically.13 In fact, the concept 
of the dialectical image was cause for contention between Adorno and Benjamin in 
the 1930s.14 As the term dialectical image is both more evocative and prevalent in the 
literature, I will employ it to describe Adorno’s concept.15  
 
Here, my aim will be to examine one specific kind of dialectical image: the work of 
art. Not only is the work of art is the best example of the dialectical image, but it is 
also the image that occupies the most central place within Adorno’s body of work. 
We will see how, for Adorno, the work of art holds a position of privilege. I think 
that for Adorno the greatest possibility of working through the past lies in the making 
and interpretation of autonomous works of art. In this way, the work of memory 
would help to fulfil a renewed categorical imperative.16 
 
                                                
12 Ibid, 103. 
13 Ibid, 103. 
14 For a good analysis of the difference between Benjamin and Adorno’s concepts see Buck-Morss The 
Origin of Negative Dialecitics, 102-106. The strife raged around the idea of the objectivity of these images. 
Also see Theodor W. Adorno, and Walter Benjamin, The Complete Correspondence, 1928-1940, ed. H. 
Lonitz, (Cambridge, Massachusetts: The Harvard University Press, 1999), 104-115. 
15 Dialectical images were very important conceptual tools and devices for German thinkers of the 
Frankfurt School and their associates in the early to mid 20th century. According to Buck-Morss, not 
only did Benjamin write about dialectical images, his work itself (eg. The Arcades Project, Berlin Childhood 
Around 1900) could be considered to be dialectical images. See Buck-Morss, Origin of Negative Dialectics, 
106.  
16 Never Again Auschwitz has often been described as Adorno’s new categorical imperative relating to 
education. Adorno, Critical Models, 191-192. Also see the section Metaphysics and Culture in the Meditations 
on Metaphysics Chapter in Theodor W. Adorno, Negative Dialectics, trans. E.B. Ashton, (New York: The 
Continuum International Publishing Group, Inc., 2005), 365. 
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Adorno’s writing on the work of art, specifically when coinciding with his writing on 
memory, offers a way of reading the problem of the relationship between art and 
memory in the contemporary context. The specific question to which the present 
project responds is: how does the work of art participate in memory work? 
 
My working hypothesis is that the work of art participates in memory work via 
sublation. The work of art preserves and negates the past by constituting it in the 
form of dialectical images. The work of art transcends the past by inviting the 
interpretation of these dialectical images. I will also argue that it is because of the 
work of art both having and being a Zeitkern (temporal nucleus) that it participates in 
memory work.  
 
Though Adorno uses the expression Zeitkern just over a dozen times in his collected 
writings, Peter Uwe Hohendahl maintains that the concept is “[…] a very important 
component of Adorno’s theory [of the artwork as a dialectical process].”17 
Nonetheless, despite its importance, the Zeitkern remains an undeveloped concept in 
the secondary literature on Adorno’s aesthetic theory. I agree with Hohendahl and 
think that greater development of the little-commented Zeitkern concept could lead to 
a better understanding not only of Adorno’s theories of the work of art, but could 
also provide for a touchstone around which to constellate the relationship between 
the work of art, history, and memory. Thinking of the Zeitkern as a conceptual pivot 
allows for a conception of the work of art that has time (history) at its centre. It also 
simultaneously allows for a reading of the work of art within a history of its reception.  
                                                
17 Peter Uwe Hohendahl, Prismatic Thought Theodor W. Adorno, (Lincoln & London: University of 




I will proceed by examining the work of art in terms of its structural features and its 
functions. The first chapter will look at how the work of art preserves and negates the 
past. I will argue that the work of art’s preservation of the past is actually a form of 
negation. The work of art’s Zeitkern is formed in this manner. The second chapter will 
look at how the past is transcended through the work of art. I will argue that the work 
of art becomes a Zeitkern within history. I will conclude the study in a comparative 
analysis of Adorno’s thoughts on specific works of art, namely works by Bertolt 
Brecht and Samuel Beckett. 
 
In terms of Adorno’s primary texts, I will focus mainly on Aesthetic Theory. As the need 
arises, I will refer to some of his other works: Kierkegaard Construction of the Aesthetic, 
Notes to Literature, and several essays from Critical Models (most notably “Working 
Through the Past”).  In terms of secondary sources, I will principally draw from the 
work of Robert Hullot-Kentor, Susan Buck-Morss, Albrecht Wellmer, Lambert 
Zuidervaart, Jay Bernstein, Max Pensky, Peter Uwe Hohendahl, and Roger Foster.  
 
 
Chapter 1: Cipher of the Past: how the work of art becomes a dialectical image 
(preserves and negates) 
 
In one of his more colourful passages on the work of art, Adorno recounts a story 
about Picasso and Guernica, which depicts the German bombing of the Spanish town 
Guernica: “When an occupying German officer visited the him in his studio and 
asked, standing before the Guernica, ‘Did you make that?,’ Picasso is said to have 
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responded, ‘No, you did.’”18 I think that this passage is an illustration of Adorno’s 
conception of the relationship of the work of art to the socio-historical moment, as 
well as of how the work of art becomes a dialectical image. As I will argue in this 
chapter, the work of art becomes a dialectical image because of its Zeitkern. In 
Adorno’s language, the Zeitkern can be conceived as “[…] the immanence of society 
in the artwork […].”19 In discussing how the work of art preserves and negates the 
socio-historical moment, in other words, how art preserves and negates the past, I will 
be able to unpack Adorno’s conception of the Zeitkern as the immanence of society in the 
artwork. This immanence is the first and most important relationship of art to society. 
However, as chapter two will explore, there is a reciprocal immanence of the artwork 
in society through which the past is transcended.  
 
Using the notion of the immanence of society in the artwork as the starting point of my 
argument, and wanting to better understand what is behind the Guernica anecdote, I 
will argue that because of its Zeitkern, the work art both preserves and negates the past 
and in so doing, becomes a dialectical image. For Adorno, the production of the 
dialectical image is fundamental to the conception of how the work of art participates 
in memory work. 
 
I will first look at how the work of art preserves the socio-historical moment and then 
how the work of art negates the socio-historical moment. The first section of the 
chapter addresses questions pertaining to the work of art’s preserving function. These 
                                                
18 Theodor W. Adorno, Notes to Literature Volume Two, trans. S. Weber Nicholsen, (New York: 
Columbia University Press, 1992), 89. 
19 Adorno, Aesthetic Theory, 232 
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include: What is the nature of that which is being preserved? How is it preserved? 
What is the new entity that emerges from this preservation? The second section of 
this chapter addresses similar questions though from the perspective of negation. 
These include: What is the nature of that which is being negated? How is it negated? 
What is the new entity that emerges from this negation? I will show that the nature of 
the preservation of the work of art’s Zeitkern is negative in character. Towards the end 
of this chapter, I develop the idea that the work of art as a dialectical image, formed 
by this negative preservation, is a cipher. This will move my argument into the second 
chapter on the work of art’s transcendent quality. 
 
I  Preservat ion 
Ia What i s  the nature o f  that which i s  be ing preserved?  
 
In characterizing the essential social relation of art as the immanence of society in the 
artwork, Adorno argues that the work of art preserves historical truth as its Zeitkern. 
By looking at the idea of historical truth, this section will be able to respond to the 
question of what the work of art preserves. 
 
Truth, for Adorno, is historical, contingent, and ephemeral. The general notion of 
truth as historical is omnipresent in Adorno’s work and fundamental to Adorno’s 
larger philosophical project expressed through critique and fragment as opposed to 
totalizing system. He clearly states that even his own work is not exempt from the 
criticism he levels at other thinkers.20 Adorno attributes the shift in philosophy’s 
                                                
20 For example, see the Preface to the new edition of the Dialectic of Enlightenment. Horkheimer and 
Adorno write: “[w]e would not now maintain without qualification every statement in the book: that 
would be irreconcilable with a theory which holds that the core of truth that is historical rather than an 
unchanging constant to be set against the movement of history.” Max Horkheimer, and Theodor W. 
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search for truth from the realm of the eternal to the realm of the ephemeral to Hegel. 
No longer must philosophy seek to be a philosophia perennis: “[t]he vested bearer of 
eternal truth.” 21 Instead, Adorno takes Hegel’s concept of philosophy as “[…] its own 
time comprehended in thought.”22 Philosophy’s compulsion towards truth, in this 
sense, is an expression of the compulsion towards understanding the truth about its 
own particular socio-historical context. I will show how it is this notion of truth that 
resonates in Adorno’s concept of the temporal truth of the Zeitkern. 
 
Similar to philosophy expressing the truth of a particular historical context, the truth 
that is preserved in the work of art is historical, contingent, and ephemeral in nature. 
Both philosophy and art express their own time in thought (in the case of philosophy) 
and image (in the case of art) because they are faits sociaux. According to Adorno, the 
authentic work of art is both autonomous and a fait social.23 In this conception, the 
idea that art is a fait social is derived from its being a product and by-product of a 
particular socio-historical moment: this moment produces and is preserved in the 
work of art. The idea of the work of art as a fait social will be discussed in greater detail 
in the next section of this chapter. The idea of art’s autonomy will occupy the second 
half of this chapter. However, before I move towards looking at how the socio-
historical moment is preserved in the work of art, I need to look a bit closer at the 
nature of the historical truth preserved in and by the work of art.  
 
                                                
Adorno, The Dialectic of Enlightenment, trans. J. Cumming, (New York: The Continuum Publishing 
Company, 2000), ix. 
21 Adorno, Critical Models, 15. 
22 Ibid, 15. 
23 Adorno, Aesthetic Theory, 225. 
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In Adorno’s concept of the expression of historical truth in the artwork, there is no 
driving teleological totality. This is analogically related to how Adorno views 
philosophical truth. To give an example, Adorno turns to Hegel. He writes: “[t]here is 
a truth in [I]dealism […].”24 This truth was relevant to the time from which Idealism 
emerged. More precisely, “Idealism is true because it grasps the ‘need’ of thought: to 
have content, to grasp the content, beyond the simplicity of simply receiving this 
content ‘empirically’.”25 The advancement of consciousness of truth and the 
expression of rational Absolute spirit was directly relevant in a time of Enlightenment 
belief in progress both in terms of technology and in terms of rationality. This belief 
is no longer relevant to us in the same manner. Throughout his work, Adorno always 
casts the idea of Enlightenment in a dialectical manner.  
 
In order to see how the idea of historical truth is expressed in art, I would like to take 
a brief look at the example of the architecture of Berlin’s Neues Museum. Originally 
built by Friedrich August Stüler in the middle of the 19th century, it was severely 
damaged by allied bombing and then left exposed to the elements until reunification. 
Re-opened in November 2009, with David Chipperfield’s new architectural concept 
blending old and new material, the Neues Museum re-assumes its collection of artifacts 
from Egypt, as well as both ancient and pre-history. However, whereas once the 
museum expressed Enlightenment faith in progress and technology, now the museum 
expresses a tension and ambiguity where progress is concerned. For example, whereas 
the content of the building shows advances in terms of the weapons and their 
potency and thus present a clear argument for the existence of progress, the form of 
                                                
24 Adorno, Critical Models, 15. 
25 I am indebted to Iain Macdonald for this formulation.  
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the building provokes questions regarding the very possibility of progress because the 
museum walls are still dotted in bullet holes resulting from the progress in weapon 
technology. In a book of essays that was released upon the re-opening of the 
museum, Peter-Klaus Schuster writes:  
A temple of memory has emerged out of what was once the temple of a 
progressive faith in history. On the Museum Island Mnemosyne has once again 
found a ‘home,’ where history is neither sentimentalised nor corrected but 
perceivable in all its shadings, graphically venerable and perilous.26 
 
These bullet holes and the constellations formed by drawing imaginary lines in 
between them illustrate Adorno’s idea of the work of art’s preservation of 
constellations of historical truth. The truth that is conveyed in these constellations 
relates to the damage sustained by the particular structure given its particular 
historical, social, and geographical context. A building with the same meaning could 
not be built in another location out of different material. The work of art is only able 
to express this contingent truth. 
 
Ib How is  the soc io-his tor i ca l  moment preserved?  
The socio-historical moment is preserved by a caesura, or a break in the temporal 
continuum that occurs during the formation of the Zeitkern. It is during this process 
that the work of art becomes a dialectical image by bringing the fleetingness of history 
to a standstill. I return to Adorno’s use of Benjamin’s notion of the image as the place 
where dialectics come to a standstill.27 As the work of art is the dialectical image par 
                                                
26 Peter-Klaus Schuster, “A Temple of Memory - On David Chipperfield’s Neues Museum,” in Rik 
Nys & Martin Reichert, ed. Neues Museum Berlin, (Cologne: Verlag der Buchhandlung Walther König), 
2009, 183. 
27 See note 6. Adorno describes the work of art as a continued dynamic, Adorno, Aesthetic Theory, 176. 
See also Adorno, Kierkegaard Construction of the Aesthetic, 54.  
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excellence, the logical conclusion to draw is that dialectics come to a halt in the work 
of art.  
 
For Adorno, movement in general, and movement in history in particular, is 
suspended in the work of art through a process of objectivation. He writes that  
[i]n art something momentary transcends; objectivation makes the artwork into 
an instant. Pertinent here is Benjamin’s formulation of a dialectic at a standstill, 
which he developed in the context of his conception of a dialectical image. If, as 
images, artworks are the persistence of the transient, they are concentrated in 
appearance as something momentary. To experience art means to become 
conscious of its immanent process as an instant at a standstill [...]’28 
 
Objectivation of the socio-historical moment in and by the artwork is the key to 
understanding how this moment is preserved. In objectivation, the past is turned into 
an object to be experienced.  
 
In order to understand objectivation and how history comes to a standstill in the 
dialectical image we can turn to Adorno’s engagement with the episode of Odysseus’ 
hanging of the maids. Adorno responds to Homer’s description of the hanging maids 
whose “[f]eet danced for a little, but ‘not for long […]’”29 in a pathos-filled manner. 
Adorno writes:  
But after the ‘not for long’ the inner flow of the narrative comes to a halt. The 
gesture of the narrator…is that of a question: Not for long? By bringing the 
                                                
28 Adorno, Aesthetic Theory, 84. See also Adorno’s description of the artwork as both process and 
instant, Adorno, Aesthetic Theory, 6, 179. For further commentary see Düttmann’s description of this 
process as a messianic stilling, Alexander García Düttmann, The Memory of Thought, an essay on Heidegger and 
Adorno, trans. N. Walker, (New York: Continuum, 2002), 95. See also Hullot-Kentor’s writing on 
Adorno’s notion of the work of art as the moment of expression where “ […] [t]he Hegelian dialectic is 
brought to a standstill […]” Robert Hullot-Kentor, Things Beyond Resemblance, Collected Essays on Theodor 
W. Adorno, (New York: Columbia University Press, 2006) 42.  
29 Homer, The Odyssey, trans. R. Fitzgerald, (New York: Doubleday & Company, Inc., 1961). Adorno 
writes about the feet of the maids in The Dialectic of Enlightenment. He uses a different translation of the 
line from the one I cited in this note in which he uses the word kicked instead of dancing. See 
Horkheimer & Adorno, The Dialectic of Enlightenment, 79.  
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account to a halt, the gesture prevents the forgetting of the condemned and 
reveals the unnameable eternal torture of the second in which the maids 
struggled against death.30 
 
The operative concept in the above quotation is the idea of the not for long. In one 
sense, the maids’ suffering was momentary; their necks broke and the struggle came 
to an end. In another sense, the maids’ suffering is eternal; the momentary struggle is 
given a form of perpetuity in the narrative.31 Adorno’s use of the story of the maids 
illustrates both the idea of the break that forms the Zeitkern, and the idea of dialectics 
at a standstill. The breaking of the maids’ necks expresses the concept of the breaking 
of the temporal continuum. Two temporalities are created for the maids. On the one 
hand time moves forward for the maids: they die, and the story of the Odyssey 
continues. On the other hand, time stands still for them: they are preserved in an 
eternal and inescapable struggle. In cruel sounding terms, the breaking of the maids’ 
necks heralds the breaking of the temporal narrative into these two aspects, the one 
linear and historical and the other a closed circle of dialectics at a standstill. In this 
instance, the Zeitkern is formed when the struggle of the maids is turned into an object 
to be experienced via its place in Homer’s narrative. This object is the dialectical 
image. 
 
As noted by Hullot-Kentor, fundamental to Adorno’s reading of the hanging maids is 
the possibility for the space opened up by the forming of the Zeitkern to be a space of 
                                                
30 Horkheimer & Adorno, The Dialectic of Enlightenment, 79. I am indebted to Hullot-Kentor’s citing of 
this passage and its modified translation in Hullot-Kentor, Things Beyond Resemblance, 43-44. 
31 Adorno is not the only one who has focused on the role of the maids and the moments in which 
they struggled against death. For example, Margaret Atwood’s 2005 work entitled Penelopiad, a re-telling 
of the Odyssey story from the perspective of Penelope. Atwood cast the maids in the role of the chorus 
and suggests that they are Penelope’s allies, who slept with the suitors in order to spy for her. Atwood 
conceives of their hanging as violent betrayal and mourns these woman in her work. The Penelopiad was 
turned into a play in 2007. See Margaret Atwood, The Penelopiad: The Myth of Penelope and Odysseus, 
(Toronto: Vintage Canada Edition, 2006). 
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remembrance.32 By breaking the narrative of temporal continuity into two different 
but related narratives, the frozen time of the maids’ struggle and the continuation of 
the narrative, the maids’ struggle is both preserved and given a presence. Analogous 
to the manner in which the breaking of maids’ necks breaks the temporal continuity 
of the narrative by opening up two temporalities, the objectivation of the socio-
historical moment by the work of art breaks the continuum of history and yields two 
temporal expressions of the past. In the first instance, once preserved, the past is 
frozen in the artwork, in other words, the dialectical movement of history is brought 
to a standstill. In the second instance, once objectivated, the past may attain a sort of 
transcendence through the artwork. This transcendence will be the subject of the 
second chapter of this study. 
 
The socio-historical moment becomes objectivated and appears in the artwork in two 
main ways: first, via the production process, and second via mimesis. In terms of the 
production process, the work of art is produced with the tools and processes that 
typify the era in which it is produced. Adorno writes: 
That artworks are not being but a process of becoming can be grasped 
technologically […] The processual quality of artworks is constituted in such a 
fashion that as artifacts, as something humanly made, they have their place a 
priori in the ‘native realm of spirit’ but are, in order to become self-identical, in 
need of what is non-identical, heterogeneous, and not already formed.33  
 
This citation contains two main points. The first is that the process that forms the 
work of art and by which the socio-historical moment is objectivated, transpires 
technologically. The work of art becomes an artifact of a particular socio-historical 
moment because it manifests the technology of this moment. The second point is that 
                                                
32 Hullot-Kentor, Things Beyond Resemblance, 44. 
33 Adorno, Aesthetic Theory, 176.  
  
18 
because time and history continue while the time and history in the work remain still, 
the artwork is not in a homeostatic state of self-identity. Both of these points relate to 
the processual character of the artwork. They also refer back to the idea of the suffering 
of the maids outliving the actual moment of suffering. I will look at the first point in 
the next couple of paragraphs and the second point in the second chapter. 
 
In terms of the first reason, the technology of a particular socio-historical moment 
participates directly in the creation of the Zeitkern. The technology is objectivated in 
the work. The objectivation relies on the idea that the work of art is a fait social that 
emanates seamlessly from its socio-historical context. The technology of a particular 
socio-historical moment expresses the general condition of the moment. For example, 
montage or collage emerged in the early modernist era, during a time in which 
questions of fragmentation of the temporal narrative first emerged at the forefront.34 
 
At present, we see an absolute proliferation of works of art using digital media and 
highly technologically advanced material.35 Our dependence on these materials and 
processes is incarnated in our works of art. Even work that chooses to not 
incorporate the newest technology still somehow exists in relation to it. If an artist 
chooses to paint a landscape using traditional methods and materials, they are making 
a specific choice against technology. In a sense, this notion is very similar to the idea 
                                                
34 See Adorno, Aesthetic Theory, 133, 218-219. Adorno discusses the possibility for art in technological 
world.  
35 A really excellent example of this is the work of New York based artist, designer, and computer 
programmer Cory Arcangel. Arcangel’s material includes youtube clips, Guitar Hero style programs, 
old film projectors and 16 mm, and video games. See his website at: http://www.coryarcangel.com 
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that it is impossible to opt out of the culture industry. Even the choice to not buy an 
iPod implicates the chooser in the logic of contemporary culture.  
 
The second way in which the past is preserved in the work of art is via mimesis. The 
following is as close as Adorno comes to offering a definition of mimesis in his 
writings on aesthetics: “The mimesis of artworks is their resemblance to themselves 
[...]”36 The artwork emerges from and is inseparable from history because it is a fait 
social. In other words, the artwork is both made by and made of society. In being 
society, the artwork resembles itself. Tom Huhn describes Adorno’s conception of 
mimesis as follows: “Mimesis is not then the copying or imitation of what has been 
but the continuity from reflection to reflection […].”37 The continuity between 
reflections Huhn finds in Adorno’s definition of mimesis draws upon Adorno’s 
notion of the artwork’s resemblance to itself, or in other words, to the society from 
which it is derived. Because the work of art is a fait social, the border between the work 
and society is porous. The porous nature of the border between the work of art and 
society is what allows society to permeate the work. 
 
In order to describe the process through which the socio-historical content permeates 
the artwork, I will turn to Paddison’s reading of Adorno. He writes:  
Adorno maintains that it is via the dialectic of mimesis and rationality that the 
outside world enters the hermetic world of the artwork – not directly, but in 
                                                
36 Adorno, Aesthetic Theory, 104. See also Hohendahl, who notes that Adorno “[…] never offers a 
formal definition of mimesis […]” Peter Uwe Hohendahl, “Adorno: The Discourse of Philosophy and 
the Problem of Language,” in Max Pensky, ed, The Actuality of Adorno, Critical Essays on Adorno and the 
Postmodern, (Albany: State University of New York Press, 1997), 81. 
37 See for example: Hullot-Kentor, Things Beyond Resemblance, 245; Tom Huhn, “Introduction,” in Tom 
Huhn ed., The Cambridge Companion to Adorno, (Cambridge: Cambridge  
University Press, 2004), 7; Max Paddison, Adorno, Modernism and Mass Culture, essays on critical theory and 
music, (London: Kahn & Averill, 1996), 61. 
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mediated form. Society, as collectivity, penetrates the work through, for 
example, historically and socially mediated musical material, through the 
process of rationalization which it both takes from the instrumental rationality 
of society and at the same time opposes, and through the mimetic impulse 
which imitates the dynamic movements of the outside world but which also 
expresses resistance to it.38 
 
While I find Paddison’s description of the permeation process very effective, and I 
am sympathetic to his discussion of the mediation and opposition that takes place 
within the artwork during the dialectic between rationality and mimesis, I struggle 
with his reliance on the idea of imitation. Imitation contradicts the idea that society 
and art are permeable because a border is established between the one imitating and 
the one being imitated. I think, the Adorno’s concept of mimesis implies a 
transformation rather than an imitation. Neither imitation nor mirroring manages to 
cross the barrier between the work of art and society because there is no real 
objectivation taking place. In order for the past to be objectivated and for mediation 
between the past and the subject interpreting the past (more on which in the second 
chapter) to take place, history must actually be immanent in the work of art. History 
may only be immanent in the work of art because the work of art is part of history: 
the work of art is thus is a fait social rather than a reflection of history. Buck-Morss 
illustrates this Adornian phenomenon in the following manner: the “[…] ‘whimpering 
vibrato’ of the jazz instrumentalist was the bourgeois subject’s helplessness […].”39 
The whimper was the whimper of helplessness, it was neither like nor analogous to 
the whimper of helplessness. The work of art is neither like nor reflective of the 
socio-historical moment, it is the socio-historical moment; it is an instantiation of 
history and not merely a representation of history. To put this relationship into a 
                                                
38 Paddison, Adorno, Modernism and Mass Culture, 61. 
39 Buck-Morss, Origin of Negative Dialectics, 102-103. 
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reciprocal equation yields the following: the work of art is an expression of history 
and history is expressed in the work of art.  
 
Another way of looking at Adorno’s concept of mimesis in the aesthetics’ context 
comes from Hohendahl who describes the objectivation process as a form of 
translation. Translation is a process through which a concept or a work is passed from 
one medium to another. In terms of the work of art and the socio-historical moment, 
historical content and processes are translated into art. The translation process, in this 
context, functions as a form of mediation. Hohendahl calls this translation process 
aesthetic imprinting. The nature of aesthetic imprinting will be discussed in further 
detail in the second part of this chapter (on negation). However, in terms of 
illustrating the idea of translation as imprinting Hohendahl gives the example of 
language as a mediating third term in the dialectical equation between art and history. 
He writes:  
The process of aesthetic imprinting works in such a way that the social forces 
are not reflected but translated, so to speak, into a linguistic form of entirely 
individual character […] The relationship is a dialectical one: in the mediation 
of poetic language the subjective expression (of suffering) turns into objective 
meaning. In other words, language is the third term that makes a social 
hermeneutics possible.40 
 
Hohendahl gives the example of this process by using poetic language, or rather 
poetry, as that which objectifies subjective suffering and thus translates it into art. The 
subjective experience is translated into objective content via the work of art. The 
work of art thus acts as a point of mediation between subject and object.  
 
                                                
40 Hohendahl, Prismaic Thought, 173-174. 
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I think that Hohendahl’s characterization of mimesis as translation better explains 
Adorno’s concept of mimesis as the process through which historical content is 
preserved in the artwork than Paddison’s concept of imitation. I prefer Hohendahl’s 
notion of translation because it implies that both objectivation and mediation take 
place; both of these processes are essential for the sublation of the past and art’s 
ability to engage in memory work.  
 
I would like to conclude this section by giving one more example, which will show 
how both the technological means and historical content of a particular moment are 
preserved in the work of art. Contemporary Canadian photographer Edward 
Burtynsky uses contemporary photography techniques and takes photos that express 
the contemporary relationship between nature and industry. In his artist statement he 
writes the following: 
Nature transformed through industry is a predominant theme in my work. I set 
course to intersect with a contemporary view of the great ages of man; from 
stone, to minerals, oil, transportation, silicon, and so on. To make these ideas 
visible I search for subjects that are rich in detail and scale yet open in their 
meaning […] These images are meant as metaphors to the dilemma of our 
modern existence; they search for a dialogue between attraction and repulsion, 
seduction and fear […] For me, these images function as reflecting pools of our 
times.41  
 
Burtynsky’s show Oil tells the story of oil, from how it is extracted, to how it is 
transported, and used. The exhibition culminates in images expressing the 
aftermath of oil from abandoned fields and surrounding communities in 
Azerbaijan to ship breaking in Bangladesh. Most important for this example, the 
exhibition also features many photos of the Alberta oil sands from pipelines to 
tailing ponds. True to his artist statement, the photos themselves express a vision 




of the relationship between nature and industry. In blatant terms, the tailing ponds 
really do give the viewer the chance to reflect on this very relationship. Perhaps the 
most significant component of this example is that Burtynsky’s Oil exhibition was 
mounted at the Art Gallery of Alberta in Edmonton in 2010/2011, one of the 
communities most affected by the wealth that the oil sands has engendered. 
Moreover, the year-old gallery clearly has a lot of oil money in its foundations in 
that a lot of the corporate sponsors are companies affiliated with the oil sands, and 
even many of the individual sponsor’s private wealth has increased greatly from the 
general prosperity of the region. Only an affluent community could afford such a 
gallery and such an exhibition. The community in question owes some of its wealth 
to the very thing being held up for contemplation in the photographs. The 
ambiguous experience of visiting these works in this place is something quite 
particular to this socio-historical moment. Thus we can say that both technological 
processes and social content are preserved in these pieces. 
 
By being a fait social, the work of art expresses the technological processes and 
historical content of its day. This expression takes place in its Zeitkern. The actual 
socio-cultural phenomena of a particular moment pass into the artwork via mimesis. 
The mimesis and obejctivation of these moments in the work of art is the first step in 
the process that transforms them into a dialectical image. The next step in the process 
closes the work of art and finalizes the preservation. This step creates a closed entity 
that Adorno describes as a windowless monad. The next section examines this entity. 
 
Ic  Conclus ion:  What i s  this  new ent i ty?  
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Adorno’s use of the monad, according to Hohendahl and Zuidervaart, is drawn from 
both Leibniz’s conception of the monad as the indivisible and harmonized unity of 
the res extensa and res cogitans, but more importantly from Benjamin’s reading of 
Leibniz.42 Zuidervaart writes: 
The concept of a monad is central to Benjamin’s model of social mediation. 
Adorno inherits this Leibnizian concept from Walter Benjamin but replaces its 
parallelist connotations with an emphasis on contradictions. Whereas Benjamin 
posits an homology between artistic and economic modes of production and 
consumption, Adorno develops tensions within the work of art that give 
expression to tensions in society as a whole.43  
 
In this citation, Adorno’s conception of the monad is shown to be characterized 
by its emphasis on tension and disharmony. In other words, that which makes it a 
unit is the impossibility of identity. The impossibility of identity in Adorno’s 
conception relates to two fundamental disharmonies in the nature of the monadic 
artwork. Regarding the first disharmony, unlike with Leibniz, for whom the 
harmony of the res extensa and res cogitans gives the structuring logic of the monad, 
for Adorno, it is the tension and contradictions in society that are preserved in the 
artwork. Because society is the content of the artwork and because society and 
history are in a constant state of tension, the work of art cannot be in harmony. By 
preserving contradiction, an internal dynamic persists within the artistic monad. 
For example, while Homer’s Odyssey is not in disharmony with itself or with 
society, it does express the disharmonious tensions of the time in which it was 
written. The second disharmony appears when considering the temporal 
dimensions of the work of art’s Zeitkern. This disharmony echoes the argument I 
                                                
42 Hohehndahl, “Adorno: The Discourse of Philosophy and the Problem of Language,” in Pensky, The 
Actuality of Adorno, 75. Also see Adorno, Aesthetic Theory, 237. 
43 Lambert Zuidervaart, “The Social Significance of Autonomous Art: Adorno and Bürger,” The Journal 
of Aesthetics and Art Criticism, Vol. 48, No. 1 (Winter, 1990), pp. 61-77, 63. See also Lambert Zuidervaart, 
Social Philosophy after Adorno, (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2007), 17, 192-193. 
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introduced in my discussion of the dual temporalities found in the example of the 
hanging maids. While the artwork mimetically resembles itself and the socio-
historical moment in which it was produced (time stands still; the maids’ struggle is 
suspended), the artwork is located in history (time moves on; the maids’ necks 
break). A dual temporality of the monadic Zeitkern ensues. The inner time of the 
artwork remains identical with itself, however, it is no longer identical with the 
changing time at its surface.  
 
Once history and society are preserved and sealed in the artwork they constitute a 
closed and windowless monad. By preserving the past as its Zeitkern, the work of art 
participates in memory work by giving the past a presence. However, further 
examination regarding the nature and effect of this preservation is required. The 
second part of this chapter will look at the idea of negation as preservation. We will 
see that for Adorno, the socio-historical content of the work of art is the suffering of 
torment of a particular moment.  
 
II Negat ion 
In the previous section of this chapter, I argued that, for Adorno, the autonomous 
work of art preserves its socio-historical moment because it is a fait social. I also 
showed that it is a closed windowless monad where the tensions, contradictions, and 
disharmony of history and society are preserved. I must now delve deeper into the 
nature of this preservation. As was argued in the previous section of this chapter, for 
Adorno, the essential social relation of art is the immanence of society in the work 
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itself.44 Upon closer inspection, we see that for Adorno, that which is social in art is 
actually its negative character. When taken up by the work of art, the socio-historical 
content becomes negative. Thus we can say that the primary social relation of art is 
the immanence of the negative in the work of art; the work of art preserves via its 
ability to negate. Adorno writes: “What is social in art is its immanent movement 
against society, not its manifest opinions. Its historical gesture repels empirical reality, 
of which artworks are nevertheless part in that they are things.”45 The second half of 
this chapter is devoted to understanding this notion.  
 
I will argue that the work of art preserves the socio-historical moment by negating it. 
As such, I will examine the idea of preservation by negation, first by establishing what 
is being negated, second, by looking at how it is negated, and finally, by analyzing the 
nature of this new entity. 
 
IIa What i s  be ing negated? 
The socio-historical moment is what is being negated in the work of art. For Adorno, 
the negation of the socio-historical moment manifests as the expression of suffering 
in the work of art. Adorno writes: “The need to lend a voice to suffering is a 
condition for all truth.”46 The work of art lends a voice to the expression of historical 
truth. However, the suffering expressed in art is not only historical. Even works that 
seem unrelated to historical suffering, still life paintings for example,47 express an 
                                                
44 See note 19. 
45 Adorno, Aesthetic Theory, 227. Also see Adorno, Aesthetic Theory, 225. 
46 Theodor W. Adorno, Negative Dialectics, trans. E.B. Ashton, (New York: The Continuum 
International Publishing Group, Inc., 2005), 25. 
47  Still life paintings often preserve an ephemeral moment when the subject of the painting is poised at 
the precipice of decay. The French translation of still life painting is nature morte. The idea of nature morte 
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existential suffering that relates to the fleeting, transient, and ephemeral nature of the 
human condition described by Hannah Arendt as a rectilinear path through a universe 
of cycles.48 Adorno writes that: “Even in a legendary better future, art could not 
disavow remembrance of accumulated horror; otherwise its form would be trivial.”49  
 
Returning to Adorno’s focus on historical suffering, we see that the expression of the 
socio-historical content in the work of art is synonymous with the remembrance, 
expression, and accumulation of suffering.50 While accumulation implies a build up or 
sedimentation of suffering in the artwork, a seemingly passive occurrence, 
remembrance and expression have two connotations. On the one hand, to express a 
condition is to manifest symptoms of that condition. On the other hand, to express is 
to actively communicate (to others, for example) this condition. Remembrance is very 
similar. An object or memorial can serve as a remembrance of something that is past, 
or that is no longer there. However remembrance is also active process. In order to 
understand this point, we can return to Picasso’s Guernica. Because of the suffering 
that occurred during the bombing of Guernica, the German officer, a historical agent, 
made Guernica without even consciously being aware of it. The soldier’s tools were 
weapons rather than paintbrushes, but these tools were as essential to Guernica’s 
fabrication as Picasso’s brushes. Adorno’s use of the Guernica anecdote shows how 
                                                
evokes a nature that can die and is dying while being preserved in the painting. Still life paintings, 
Dutch Vanitas paintings for example, often contain symbols of time, death, and decay. They remind us 
of our mortality and our fleetingness. For a description of Vanitas paintings see: 
http://www.rijksmuseum.nl  
48 Hannah Arendt, The Human Condition, Condition (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1998), 18-19. 
49 Adorno, Aesthetic Theory, 324. Adorno also writes that: “The expression of history in things is no 
other than that of past torment.” Theodor W. Adorno, .Minima Moralia, trans. E. Jephcott, (New York: 
Verso, 2005) 49.  For commentary on this see Roger Foster, Adorno, The Recovery of Experience, (Albany: 
The State University of New York Press, 2007), 24. 
50 Adorno, Aesthetic Theory, 24, 260-261.  
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both active and passive expression and remembrance occur in the artwork: 
remembrance is active because Picasso consciously painted it, and passive because the 
German soldier was neither conscious nor aware of his implication in the painting. 
 
In the context of the twentieth century, we see how, for Adorno, the presence of the 
past that manifests in artistic remembrance and expression is similar to that of a scar 
on a body: a scar is the trace of suffering left behind.51 Guernica, for example, is also 
battle scar. Like a scar expressing the story of a wound without necessarily or directly 
telling the story of the injury that caused it, the Zeitkern within work of art expresses 
the suffering of history without necessarily or directly recounting a historical 
narrative. This is salient for Adorno. As will be shown both in the next section of this 
chapter and in chapter three, Adorno privileges works that express suffering and thus 
offer an implicit critique at the expense of those that directly criticize.  
 
Wellmer highlights Adorno’s use of the scar metaphor and writes: 
In the scars of disintegration and disruption, which according to Adorno are the 
marks of authenticity in modern art, the artwork expresses the truth that the 
world can no longer be understood as a totality of meaning. […] [It] 
transform[s] the fragile, broken-off, and abysmal character of the world of 
meaning into aesthetic sense, the artwork illuminates this world, communicating 
the non-communicable. […] by transforming the terror of what is unintelligible 
into aesthetic delight, it widens, at the same time, the space of communicatively 
shared meaning.52  
                                                
51 Adorno is particularly interested in how modern art expresses the suffering of the 20th century, see 
Adorno, Aesthetic Theory, 23. For commentary on modern art and the non-identity and how the work 
illuminat[es] the darkness by articulating its contradictions see Albrecht Wellmer “Adorno, Modernity, and the 
Sublime,” in Pensky, The Actuality of Adorno, 120. See also Hohendahl’s comment that modern art 
articulates horror of 20th century in Hohendahl, Prismatic Thought, 86-87. 
52 Wellmer, “Adorno, Modernity, and the Sublime,” in Pensky, The Actuality of Adorno 130-131. See also 
“To say the unsayable is to give voice to meaninglessness to the wrong of society as a whole; to say 
that this is unsayable is to acknowledge that the conditions for so speaking are not themselves properly 




Because the work of art exhibits the scar of disintegration of the modern world, it 
preserves the past as something that is fragile, and broken. Recalling the idea of 
Adorno’s monadic Zeitkern as a disharmonious unity, what we see is that the nature of 
the preserved socio-historical content is fragmented and negative. It is only by 
preserving this accumulated suffering, in other words, the negative and fragmented 
content of both society and history that the work of art can be thought of as having a 
truth content. There are no ‘positive’ truths in Adorno’s thinking; the only truths are 
fleeting, ephemeral, and contingent - and thus historical. In fact, Adorno conceives of 
the work of art as the unconscious writing of history. He writes both that works of art 
are “[…] the self-unconscious historiography of their epoch […]”53 and that history 
speaks in them.54 As the unconscious writing of history, the work of art expresses that 
which may not or cannot be consciously expressed. In other words, the work of art 
expresses the unutterable.55  
 
The second point in the Wellmer citation, that the work of art mediates a relationship 
between the present and the past while having the possibility to transform terror into a 
space of meaning, is problematic. For Adorno the very possibility of finding or 
attributing meaning to suffering may render suffering instrumental. Instead, Adorno 
                                                
“Fragment, Fascination, Damaged Life: ‘The Truth about Hedda Gabbler,’ in Pensky, The Actuality of 
Adorno, 164 -165. 
53 Adorno, Aesthetic Theory, 182. For Adorno this is the anti-historicism argument. Hullot-Kentor writes 
that this notion is the key to understanding Adorno’s aesthetics, see for example: “[a]rt because the 
unconscious writing of history through its isolation from society.” Hullot-Kentor, Things Beyond 
Resemblance, 70.  
54 Ibid, 111-112, 114. 
55 Ibid, 205. Adorno is writing about Benjamin’s concept of language as both conveying and concealing. 
Hullot-Kentor writes that “[t]he central thesis of Adorno’s aesthetics is that art becomes the 




advocates for the possibility of turning this unconscious manifestation of history into 
a conscious interpretation of both history and the contemporary situation. This 
process will be discussed in the second chapter of this study. 
 
This section has established that the socio-historical moment preserved in the work 
of art is negative. This negative content is the expression of the unconscious and 
incommunicable suffering of the past. The next part of this section will look at how 
this negative content becomes immanent in the work of art. What is the difference 
between simple preservation and preservation by negation?  
 
IIb How does negat ion work? 
To preserve something by transforming it into art is already a form of negation. 
Transformation is a form of negation because, by preserving the socio-historical 
moment, the artwork changes the temporal dimension of the moment. The moment 
is both liberated from its original context but frozen in a dynamic of perpetual 
presence. Adorno writes: “Art preserves [the socio-historical moment] and makes it 
present by transforming it: This is the social explanation of its temporal nucleus.”56 A 
similar preserving negation transforms the non-communicable past into the negative 
social content of the Zeitkern. This transformation process must be looked at in 
greater detail. There are two main kinds of negative transformation: imprinting, and 
opposing.  
 
                                                
56 Adorno, Aesthetic Theory, 229. Adorno also argues that the transformation takes place when the 
content of a particular socio-historical moment becomes the form of the work of art, see Adorno, 
Aesthetic Theory, 139-140. 
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Adorno’s use of the metaphor of imprinting in his aesthetic theory has been picked 
up by several commentators. Hohendahl conceives of Adorno’s concept of aesthetic 
imprinting as when processes and content are arrested in and imprinted on the 
artwork;57 Ziarek writes that: “Adorno’s idea of the non-identical in art, [is] of art as 
the negative imprint of social reality […].”58 To understand what Adorno means by 
imprinting and how it changes the temporality of the socio-historical moment I will 
look closer at this process. 
 
The notion of imprinting suggests negation both literally and metaphorically. On a 
very literal level, an object may be pressed into warm wax giving a negative imprint of 
the original object. A plaster mould may be formed out of the impression an object 
leaves in the clay. Fingerprints may be taken when a finger coated in ink is pressed 
against a piece of paper. In all of these cases, it is the impression that is left behind 
rather than the object itself. The impression is always an inverse, or a negative image, 
of the original image. These particular impressions offer the possibility to take a new 
and positive print from the original imprint. The new print is a copy of the original 
object, but this copy could not have been taken without the negative mediation of the 
imprint. Perhaps the best example, and an example that leads us back to the context 
of the work of art, is a traditional etching. In order to make prints, a negative image is 
scratched or carved into a plate. An imprint of the image is created from which prints 
are made.  
                                                
57 Hohendahl, Prismatic Thought, 171-172. See also Hohendahl, Prismatic Thought, 152-153.  
58 Krzysztof Ziarek, “Radical Art: Reflections after Adorno and Heidegger,” in Nigel Gibson & 
Andrew Rubin (ed), Adorno A Critical Reader, (Malden, Massachusetts: Blackwell Publishers Inc), 2002, 
352. Adorno himself uses the word imprint to denote the way in which history is translated into the 




In all of the examples in the previous paragraph, the impression is always the negative 
imprint of that which is being preserved. The negative imprint of the socio-historical 
moment in the work of art functions in a similar manner. By expressing the negative 
of a particular moment, for example its suffering, the work of art functions as a sort 
of etching plate: it preserves the past by a process of negation. Picture for a moment a 
battlefield. The footprints and other traces and scars left behind may very well tell 
more about the battle than any intentional and directed narrative that must pass 
through the filter of the teller’s subjectivity. The work of art then, is like footprints 
left behind that convey the memory of that which has walked by.59 Because the work 
is an imprint, it is also an instantiation of history and not merely a representation of 
history. While Picasso’s Guernica is a representation of the suffering caused by the 
German bombing, as an imprint, it instantiates this socio-historical moment. Through 
the negative process of imprinting, the socio-historical moment is preserved and the 
past is given a presence. 
 
The second process through which negation becomes preservation is that of 
opposition. Negation by opposition relates to the work of art asserting its autonomy. 
The form of opposition Adorno favours does not imply an explicit social critique. 
Rather, for Adorno opposition and critique are implicit in his concept of the 
                                                
59 The most beautiful expression of this idea that I have encountered comes from a work of art (The 
Book of Recurrent Dreams) within a work of art (Jonathan Safran Foer’s Everything is Illuminated): “You will 
remember when a bird crashed through the window and fell to the floor. You will remember, those of 
you who were there, how it jerked its wings before dying, and left a spot of blood on the floor after it 
was removed. But who among you was first to notice the negative bird it left in the window? Who first 
saw the shadow that the bird left behind, the shadow that drew blood from any finger that dared to 
trace it, the shadow that was better proof of the bird’s existence than the bird ever was?” Jonathan 
Safran Foer, Everything is Illuminated, (New York: Penguin Books, 2002), 38. 
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autonomous artwork. If, as mentioned at the beginning of this chapter, the essential 
social relation of art is the immanence of society in the work, and art’s social character 
is negative, then we can understand what Adorno means when he argues that “[…] 
art becomes social by its opposition to society […] What is social in art is its 
immanent movement against society.”60 The work of art engages in critique by virtue 
of the piece of society it contains within it; as an instantiation of the socio-historical 
moment, the Zeitkern can be seen as an expression of critique.  
 
Huhn describes this Adornian phenomenon as follows  “Art is then something that 
achieves autonomy rather than having its freedom bestowed upon it by something 
else […].”61 Autonomy comes with the work of art’s innate potential to critique the 
society of which is a fait social. However, what distinguishes the critique of 
autonomous art from that of other art (such as engaged art) is the immanent nature of 
the critique. Adorno writes:  
The critical concept of society, which inheres in authentic artworks without 
needing to be added to them, is incompatible with what society must think of 
itself if it is to continue as it is; the ruling consciousness cannot free itself from 
its own ideology without endangering society’s self-preservation.62 
 
Adorno is arguing two things in this citation: first, that the autonomous and authentic 
work of art is already an expression of critique without being overtly critical, and 
second, that there is often a schism between the image expressed in the artwork and, 
in Adorno’s words, the ideology of the ruling consciousness. That art is already an 
                                                
60 Adorno, Aesthetic Theory, 225-227. This is quoted in Huhn, Cambridge Companion to Adorno, 14. See 
also“Art is the social antithesis of society, not directly deducible form it” Adorno, Aesthetic Theory, 8; 
and Adorno’s comment that art bears its opposite, Adorno, Aesthetic Theory, 344. For additional 
commentary Ziarek, “Radical Art: Reflections after Adorno and Heidegger,” in Gibson & Rubin, 
Adorno A Critical Reader, 346. 
61 Huhn, Cambridge Companion to Adorno, 14.  
62 Adorno, Aesthetic Theory, 236. 
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expression of critique relates to the expression of negative socio-historical content 
(i.e. suffering) via the technological means and processes that pervade the socio-
historical moment. The schism between the self-image of the socio-historical moment 
and its image in the work of art represents both the reciprocity and co-dependence of 
preservation and negation, as well as the dangerous potential effects of disconnecting 
preservation and negation. The work of art’s autonomy comes from the fact that a 
negative and critical fait social is expressed in the work of art. Even though it is 
difficult for the socio-historical moment to perceive itself in the image held up to it by 
immanent critique, finding affirmation in the image held up to it by overt critique is 
far more dangerous, because it disconnects preservation from negation. Overt critique 
presents a critical standpoint within current logical and ideological structures rather 
than expressing these structures as instrumental and totalizing. Adorno notes that in 
order for society to free itself from its own ideology, it must recognize that self-preserving 
instinct of its logical structures even within overt critique. For Adorno, preservation 
and negation must be simultaneous. As will be shown in the third chapter, the 
inseparability of preservation and negation is one of the main reasons for which 
Adorno prefers the autonomous work of Beckett to the engaged work of Brecht.  
 
In order to illustrate the work of art’s ability to oppose via immanent critique, I will 
return to the example of the Burtynsky Oil exhibition. The photographs in the 
exhibition do not directly criticize the tar sands project. The photos are critical not 
because they engage in overt political or social critique. The act of simply showing the 
tailing ponds is a form of implicit critique. The photos are critical because they let the 
oil sands expose themselves as detrimental to the environment. The entire exhibition 
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is structured in a way that consciously avoids both the moralizing and the normative; 
the exhibition expresses the unconscious historiography of their epoch. As such, not 
only do the photographs preserve in a negative fashion, they open up a space for 
critique and interpretation during the aesthetic experience. When confronting the 
work of art, as will be discussed in greater detail in the final section of this chapter as 
well as in the following chapter, society confronts itself. Because the work of art is 
both a fait social and autonomous, and because it preserves society by incarnating its 
negative, the work of art fulfills its critical function.  
 
IIc  What i s  the funct ion o f  the ent i ty  created by this  preserv ing negat ion? 
If the past is preserved in the artwork by negation, then what happens to this past?  
How does it become present and function within Adorno’s conception of the 
memory work potential of the work of art? I would like to argue that the past is given 
a presence because the Zeitkern presents itself as an enigma and a cipher.  
 
In his own words, Adorno claims: “All artworks – and art altogether are enigmas 
[…]”63 In her reading of Adorno, Buck-Morss states that social reality is visible in the 
work of art as: 
[…] a code language, ‘ciphers’ of sociohistorical truth, whose translation into 
the conceptual language of Marx and Freud provided their interpretation, 
making it possible to ‘transform’ them into a readable text […] These optical 
puzzles are called Vexierbilder in German, which was how Benjamin described 
the fragments he published as Einbahnstrasse (1928). Adorno used the term in 
his own writings […]64 
 
                                                
63 Ibid, 120.  
64 Buck-Morss, The Origin of Negative Dialectics, 102-103. 
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I concur with Buck-Morss’s reading. As a cipher, the work of art figures as a text to 
be decoded.65 If the work of art is a text to be decoded then the decoding reveals the 
work’s immanent, contingent, ephemeral, and historical truth. Deciphering exposes 
the socio-historical moment that is preserved via negation in the artwork, or, in other 
words, the immanence of society in the work of art is revealed. 
 
Adorno characterizes the work of art’s text as enigmatic rather than clear. It is open 
to interpretation rather than closed in a univocal fashion. Adorno writes: “That 
artworks say something and in the same breath conceal it expresses this 
enigmaticalness from the perspective of language.”66 In arguing that the work of art, 
like language, simultaneously says something and conceals it, Adorno implies that they 
pose riddles to be interpreted. That which needs to be interpreted is the historical 
truth content.  
 
In becoming a cipher of the past, where the past is preserved and negated, the work 
of art becomes a dialectical image. It is a dialectical image because the social-historical 
reality of the past is given a presence whose enigmatic nature invites interpretation. 
The enigmatic nature of the dialectical image is what, for Adorno, presents an 
opportunity for a working through of the past.  This idea will be developed in the 
next chapter. 
 
                                                
65 In a similar reading, Miriam Hansen has described the text constituted by the work of art as 
hieroglyphic. See Miriam Bratu Hansen, “Mass Culture as Hieroglyphic Writing: Adorno, Derrida, 
Kracauer,” in Pensky, The Actuality of Adorno, 86. For commentary on Hansen’s reading see Hohendahl, 
“Adorno: The Discourse of Philosophy and the Problem of Language,” in Pensky, Actuality of Adorno, 
77. 
66 Adorno, Aesthetic Theory, 120.  
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III Conclus ion to Chapter  One 
This chapter looked at Adorno’s conception of the work of art’s ability to preserve 
the past by negating it. I argued that the formation of the work of art’s Zeitkern is due 
to its being both a fait social and autonomous. I also argued that, for Adorno, the work 
of art appears as a cipher whose historical truth content needs to be deciphered and 
can thus be considered a dialectical image. But the question is how do we read these 
ciphers? What do they tell us about ourselves? How does the work of art transcend its 
borders? 
 
While I have shown how the work of art preserves and negates the past, and in so 
doing, I demonstrated the immanent character of society in the artwork, to see how 
the past is transcended through the artwork, I will need to examine the immanence of 
the artwork in society. The second chapter (on transcendence) will look at this 
relationship, while the final chapter (on Beckett and Brecht) will illustrate how the 
work of art engages in memory work. 
 
 
Chapter 2: Transcendence: Interpreting the Cipher - How to Read the Work of 
Art as Dialectical Image 
 
I Transcendence 
My depiction of Adorno’s conception of the Zeitkern in the previous chapter showed 
that once the past becomes immanent in the artwork two things happen: first, the 
past is permanently and irrevocably preserved and negated in the artwork, second, the 
entity created by this process may be considered to be a dialectical image. In order to 
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complete the analysis of how the work of art permits for a dialectical working through 
of the past we need to look at transcendence, the third part of dialectical sublation. A 
puzzling question arises immediately: how can something whose fundamental 
characteristic is its immanence (such as the socio-historical moment in the work of 
art) also have a form of transcendence? How does the past that is in the work of art 
go beyond its monadic limits?  
 
In this chapter I will argue that, for Adorno, transcendence of the past occurs when 
the work of art, conceived as a dialectical image, becomes a Zeitkern in its own right 
and that this Zeitkern is lodged within history. Thus if the main argument of the 
previous chapter established both that the work of art has a Zeitkern and examined its 
significance, this chapter argues that the work of art is a Zeitkern whose significance is 
the role it plays in Adorno’s conception of memory work. I will argue that while the 
past is preserved and negated in the work of art, for Adorno, its transcendence occurs 
through the work of art. In so doing, I will show how the work of art’s immanent 
socio-historical moment remains intact while simultaneously being transcended via 
the place of the work of art in a larger and changing historical context 
 
While the past is preserved and negated by the work of art, the past is transcended 
through the work of art. The difference between by and through will become apparent 
during this chapter as the work of art, with its Zeitkern, will be characterized as a 
vessel of mediation between the socio-historical moment when the work was created 
and the ever-changing socio-historical moment in which the work is interpreted. This 
chapter will analyze both how the work of art becomes a Zeitkern, and the dual 
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temporality of the artwork. I will therefore first examine what Adorno means by 
transcendence in the context of the work of art and the past. This will introduce the 
concept of duality where the past’s immanence makes its transcendence possible. 
Second, I will examine Adorno’s concept of interpretation. This chapter concludes 
the investigation into the structural elements of the work of art that permit it to 
engage in memory work. 
  
Ia The Mater ia l  o f  Transcendence :  What i s  the nature o f  that which i s  involved 
in transcendence? 
 
 In the previous chapter I argued that the work of art has a Zeitkern that is comprised 
of the preserved and negated socio-historical moment. The work then becomes a 
dialectical image and thus a cipher. I would now like to argue that when the work of 
art becomes a dialectical image and a cipher, it also becomes a Zeitkern. I wish to draw 
the following analogy: just as the socio-historical moment permeates and remains 
sealed in the work of art, so too does the work of art become a closed piece of history 
that is set within a larger historical context. The dual use of the idea of the Zeitkern 
produces an interesting effect: the temporal core of the work of art remains intact and 
impenetrable while the work itself gets exposed to historical time. It is through this 
process, according the Adorno, that transcendence of the past through the mediation 
of the work of art occurs.  
 
Adorno’s approach to the place of the artwork within history is unique in that it is 
concerned with both the inner time and the outer time of the work. Unlike a 
historicist approach that stresses a contextual analysis, and a response driven 
approach that focuses on the history of the artwork’s reception, Adorno’s approach is 
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not historical. Instead, Adorno understands the place of artwork in history as one in 
which the inner time of the artwork conditions the outer response to it. The effect of 
this conditioning can be seen by examining Adorno’s thoughts relative to both 
historicist and reception based approaches. 
 
It is relatively easy to distinguish Adorno’s concepts from those of a historicist 
approach to art. In a historicist approach, the emphasis is placed upon the Zeitkern 
within the work of art. The viewer and critics seek to establish a connection with the 
artwork by contextualizing it within a general historical narrative as well as within the 
history of art. For Adorno, while the work of art does contain a historical 
constellation, it is not the re-construction of this constellation that is the primary role 
of critique and aesthetic theory.  Hullot-Kentor writes that in Adorno’s conception of 
aesthetics: “[…] works are not studied in the interest of returning them to their own 
time and period, documents of ‘how it really was,’ but rather according to the truth 
they release in their own process of disintegration.”67 The idea of truth being released 
will be discussed in further detail in the second section of this chapter, in my analysis 
of Adorno’s theory of interpretation. The key idea here is that perhaps outer time, or 
the work of art considered as a Zeitkern within a larger history, presents a more 
effective means of characterizing the possibility for the transcendence of the past in 
Adorno’s concept of the work of art. However, this characterization brings Adorno’s 
concepts into contact with reception-based approaches whose emphasis on the 
interpreters rather than that which is being interpreted seems, at first glance, close to 
Adorno’s concept of the work of art as a Zeitkern. 
                                                




It is harder to distinguish Adorno’s concepts from a reception based approach, 
because both are very interested in what happens outside of the work rather than 
strictly what is inside. Looking closer, the two conceptions of the work of art and the 
trajectory of the artwork throughout history differ because a theory focused on the 
reception of the work is interested solely in this trajectory while Adorno’s theory is 
concerned with both the work of art’s Zeitkern and the work as a Zeitkern. He is also 
interested in the relationship between the two entities. In order to look deeper at the 
significance of the difference between Adorno’s theories and the response based 
approach, for example receptions theory,68 I will examine one of Hohendahl’s 
comments:  
[Adorno] argues that the work of art, since it is not anything fixed or definite 
but something dynamic, shares its immanent temporality with both the whole 
and its parts by unfolding their relations through time. Just as artworks, given 
their processual nature, exist in history, they also vanish within the process of 
history (GS 7:266; AT 255). What Adorno suggests is more than the 
conventional notion that the reception of artworks changes with time, that the 
reception has its own history, instead, he makes the much stronger claim that 
the essence or spirit of the artwork, for which he uses the term Geist, is exposed 
to historical time. There is no timeless idea of the masterpiece; hence, it can 
expire like any other human product.69  
 
Here we see several important points. First Hohendahl states that there are two 
related dynamics at play: the immanent temporality (a constant interplay between the 
whole and the parts) and the exposure of this inner Zeitkern to history (a constant 
                                                
68  Reception Theory is a literary theory that focused on the importance of the reception of the work. 
The theorists analyzed and traced reader responses. Reception theory emerged in the 1960s but 
remained an influential school of thought for several decades. Much of the work was done in 
Germany. Hans-Robert Jauss is often considered the founder of reception theory. For an excellent 
introduction to Reception Theory, see Peter Uwe Hohendahl, “Introduction to Reception Aesthetics,” 
New German Critique No. 10 (Winter 1977): 29-63. 
69 Hohendahl, Prismatic Thought, 198-199. For an excellent account of the difference between Adorno’s 
aesthetic theory and receptions theory see Christoph Menke, The Sovereignty of Art Aesthetic Negativity in 
Adorno and Derrida, trans. N. Solomon, (Cambridge, Massachusetts: Massachusetts Institute of 
Technology, 1998), 62. 
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interplay between the inner historical core and the history outside). The exposed 
dynamic is what I am calling the outer Zeitkern. Second, Hohendahl argues that 
Adorno has no concept of the timeless masterpiece. Hohendahl’s comment suggests a 
concept of dual temporalities where one is inner and one is outer. Hohendahl argues 
that the simultaneity of the intact yet dynamic Zeitkern and the dynamism of the work 
of art as a Zeitkern accounts for the processual character of the work of art. There is 
thus an analogical relationship between the inner and outer dynamics of the work. 
These dual temporalities are also parallel to the dual temporalities introduced in my 
discussion of Adorno’s interpretation of the hanging maids episode. The inner time of 
the artwork parallels the time preserved by the narrative (the maids perpetual 
struggle), while the outer time of the work parallels the time that moves on (the necks 
break, the story continues). The significance of the dual temporality concept will be 
discussed in further detail in the concluding section of this chapter. 
 
From Hohendahl’s reading, we see that for Adorno, two impossibilities present 
themselves: it is impossible to separate the reception of the work from the work 
itself, and it is also impossible to directly access the historical moment. The inner 
time, or more specifically, the past, cannot be taken out of the work of art but nor 
can it be ignored when discussing the truth content that is revealed by the work. 
The resolution of this tension is that for Adorno, the work uses the inner historical 
constellation of the work to illuminate the historical moment in which it finds 
itself. 70 The work of art may thus be considered a site of mediation; it mediates 
access to the inaccessible past. Returning again to the example of the Odyssey, 
                                                
70 Adorno, Aesthetic Theory, 178. The idea of the artwork releasing truth in its decay (see Hullot-Kentor, 
Things Beyond Resemblance, 83) and illumination will be discussed in the second chapter of this study. 
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perhaps we could suggest that in suspending time in the brief moment in which 
the maids struggled against death, the work of art provides a moment for 
reflection. In this moment, it is not only the struggle of the maids that we 
contemplate. Instead, the struggling and suffering of the maids offers us the 
possibility to contemplate our own struggles against death. Not only are we given 
insight into the history and politics of ancient Greece, we are confronted by our 
own politics and history. The historical logic that created the work of art also 
creates the parameters of a changing but sustained response to it. 
 
To understand Adorno’s notion of how the work of art mediates our relationship to 
the past as well as how this differs from both a historicist and response based 
approach, consider a set of Russian matryoshka (nesting) dolls. The Zeitkern of the 
work is like the first indivisible figure, whose shape and character ultimately dictates 
the shape and character of the whole doll. The Zeitkern as the work is the stack of 
dolls whose layers represent the various incarnations the work has encountered during 
its historical wanderings. In this model, the doll itself, with its continuingly forming 
layers, is transcendent of its original context. Even the core, which remains 
completely intact and undisturbed in its unbroken immanence has a sort of 
transcendence. Looking at the example relative to my discussion of Adorno, the 
historicist approach, and the response based approach, I would suggest that: the 
historicist approach’s focus would rest on the central figure; the response based 
approach’s attention would be drawn to the layers; and Adorno would be most 
interested in how the innermost doll conditions the outer layers. No news layers can 
be added to the doll that do not respond to the shape and integrity both of the 
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innermost doll as well as the progressive layering of the whole. The work of art 
functions similarly: the preservation and negation of the past occurs by the Zeitkern at 
the core of the artwork, while the transcendence of the past occurs through the 
historical trajectory of the work of art when considered as a Zeitkern.71 Furthermore, 
just as Adorno’s suggestion that the past lives on through unbroken objective conditions,72 
the centripetal gravity of the whole stack of dolls is maintained by the persistent 
presence of the core doll. The notion of the innermost doll’s centripetal gravity 
expresses both the inaccessibility and conditioning function of the historical moment. 
This relationship is the foundation of the work of art’s ability to mediate the 
relationship of the present to the past.  
 
To understand this mediation process we need to address the following questions: 
what happens to the Zeitkern that is the work of art as it finds itself in time? How is it 
exposed to history? How does the light of the inner historical constellation illuminate 
contemporary situations? To answer this question, the next section will examine 
interpretation, the process through which the past is transcended through the 
mediation of the work of art.  
 
1b Interpretat ion:  how does this  transcendence funct ion? 
After having given an account of Adorno’s concept of the work of art’s transcendent 
character as that which mediates access to the past, this section will focus on the 
                                                
71  For a similar idea see Adorno’s comment “Benjamin once spoke of the traces that the innumerable 
eyes of the beholders have left behind on many paintings […]” Adorno, Aesthetic Theory, 193. The 
context of Adorno’s comment is that th reception of the artwork cannot be neglected. For Adorno, the 
imprint of the eyes (the history of the reception) is fundamental to the aesthetic experience. 
72 See note 4. 
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process through which the past is accessed: interpretation. I will examine the nature 
of Adorno’s concept of interpretation in two steps. The first step looks at how the 
work of art needs interpretation. The second step uses Adorno’s commentators to 
parse exactly what Adorno means by philosophical interpretation. What emerges will 
be a conception of interpretation of the work of art that is more akin to a form of 
self-reflection as opposed to a form a solving riddles.  
 
First, for Adorno and his main commentators, the work of art itself is both in need of 
interpretation and calls for it. Adorno writes that the work of art is waiting for 
explication: “Artworks, especially those of the highest dignity, await their 
interpretation.”73 Amongst the most obvious example of this is a piece of theatre or 
music. A form of interpretation takes place every time a piece is played. While putting 
on a play gives a presence to the socio-historical moment in which the play was 
written and that is incarnated in the work itself, the interpretation of the play 
expresses more about the socio-historical moment in which the play is performed. 
Greek tragedy and Shakespeare, for example, are not to be considered as timeless 
masterpieces. Instead, these works of art are consistently and renewably timely in that 
they often offer the greatest insight into the contemporary socio-historical situation.  
 
Not only does the work of art give the past a present as I argued in establishing the 
work of art as a medium of mediation, Adorno goes further and argues that it is the 
                                                
73  Adorno, Aesthetic Theory, 128. For commentary see: Buck-Morss, The Origin of Negative Dialectics, 97; 
Max Pensky, “Editor’s Introduction: The Actuality of Adorno,” in Pensky, The Actuality of Adorno, 3-4; 
Albrecht Wellmer, Versuch über Musik und Sprache, (München: Carl Hanser Verlag, 2009), 151. 
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present that constitutes the past (rather than the past constituting the present).74  
Adorno is not talking about historical revisionism nor is he suggesting that the 
present is independent from the past. He is arguing that while the core of the artwork 
remains unalterable, at its surface level, the work of art may be interpreted in different 
ways. Similar to the way in which the innermost core of the matryoshka doll conditions 
all its subsequent layers, the historical core of the artwork ought to condition all of its 
subsequent interpretations. However, clearly a work of art may be co-opted for 
nefarious political purposes such as propaganda or the forging of a totalitarian 
founding myth. For Adorno, this is not just a misinterpretation of the work, but a 
rereading with a purpose beyond interpretation. As Adorno puts it, a work may 
become un-interpretable or, in perhaps the worst-case scenario, it may become 
ideology.75  
 
Even extreme instances of misinterpretation and rereading demonstrate Adorno’s 
claim that we don’t understand art, art understands us.76 Our use and misuse of the 
work of art and the history immanent in the work of art express more about the way 
we understand ourselves than the way we understand the moment in which the work 
was created. Our self-understanding is conditioned by the historical core of the work. 
Moments in which the work is misinterpreted or reread without regard to the integrity 
of its core are dishonest and exploitative. Interpretation is thus the way in which we 
                                                
74 Adorno, Aesthetic Theory, 41. 
75 See Adorno, Aesthetic Theory, 194 and 228.  
76 In his introduction to Aesthetic Theory, Hullot-Kentor cites Adorno’s argument from his Beethoven 
work: “‘We don’t understand music, it understands us.’” (See Hullot-Kentor, “Introdcution,” to 
Adorno, Aesthetic Theory, xii). Hullot-Kentor claims that this is analogously true for all forms of art. This 




understand ourselves by using the work of art and its Zeitkern as medium for self-
reflection. Wellmer refers to this Adornian process as a Reflexionspiel.77 
 
However, performing a piece of theatre or music is only one kind of interpretation. 
More important for Adorno is the idea of philosophical interpretation.78 The second 
point I want to explore is how philosophical interpretation works. Following several 
of Adorno’s main commentators (Pensky, Foster, Bernstein, amongst others), I will 
argue that philosophical interpretation takes the form of critique and deciphering.79 
However, I will disagree with Pensky as to the nature of the riddles philosophical 
interpretation deciphers in Adorno’s concept of the transcendence of the past 
through the work of art. This disagreement will ultimately allow me to finish my 
analysis of the work of art’s temporal structures and show how these structures allow 
it to engage in memory work. 
 
As Pensky argues, for Adorno interpretation is the principal task of philosophy:  
[…] interpretation, - the only justifiable task left to post-idealist philosophy – 
was for the early Adorno the task of the revelation of historical truth, and this 
was to be had by the philosophical construction of historical images from out 
of the material of an inherently unstable, contradictory, and self-fragmenting 
text of the social world. To the interpreting gaze the social world appears not 
just as text but as riddle, as visual puzzle or Vexierbild […] The solution to textual 
puzzles however, must consist […] [in] the inherently practical interpretation 
whereby the puzzle-like character of the real flashes into images which point 
indirectly toward the dissolution of the puzzle-like character of the real. 
Interpretation is thus the construction of historical constellations out of the 
waste products of social reality […]80  
                                                
77  Wellmer, Versuch über Musik und Sprache, 148-151. 
78 Commentators such as Hohendahl and Wellmer cite interpretation as key in terms of establishing the 
transcendent role of the artwork by situating it in a dialectical relationship with philosophy. See for 
example: Hohendahl, “Adorno, The Discourse of Philosophy and the Problem of Language,” in 
Pensky, Actuality of Adorno, 78;  Wellmer, Versuch über Musik und Sprache, 130, 151. 
79 See specifically Adorno, Aesthetic Theory, 128-131.  




While I agree with Pensky on the matter of the importance of philosophical 
interpretation of art, I disagree with him on three main points in his reading of 
Adorno’s idea of this interpretation. The first point relates to Pensky’s argument that 
philosophical interpretation constructs the dialectical images. My reading of Adorno 
has argued that the work of art becomes a dialectical image by virtue of its 
preservation and negation of the socio-historical moment at its inner Zeitkern. 
Philosophical interpretation, in my reading, involves the trajectory of the work of art 
as a Zeitkern throughout history. Pensky suggests that, for Adorno, the historical 
material of the social world is forged into historical images. I would argue that 
Bernstein’s reading of the philosophical interpretation as a second reflection81 is closer 
to Adorno’s conception. 82 In siding with Bernstein over Pensky, I read Adorno’s 
concept of the dialectical image to be made not during interpretation but rather 
during the creation of the work itself; creating these images is the role of art, while 
interpreting them is the role of philosophy. I would, however, take a key point from 
this aspect of Pensky’s reading in that for Adorno, it is philosophy’s role to read these 
images as coherent constellations in piecing together the text of the social world. This 
being the case, these texts are twice removed from the social world in that they are 
mediated first by art and second by philosophy.  
 
                                                
81 Jay M. Bernstein, Fate of Art – aesthetic alienation from Kant to Derrida and Adorno, (Cambridge: Polity 
Press, 1992), 199. Bernstein argues that in using the Zeitkern as a medium for reflection, philosophical 
interpretation, for Adorno, may actually be considered as a form of second reflection on the socio-
historical truth content that is immanent to the artwork. This reflection is considered to be a form of 
second reflection, because the work of art itself is a mimetic instantiation of the constituting socio-
historical moment. In Bernstein’s conception, the work of art, by its synthesis of various elements, 
functions reflectively in a philosophical manner. Philosophical interpretation of the work of art is thus 
a form of second reflection.  
82 Please see notes 14 and 15 as well as my discussion of the dialectical image and how, for Adorno, its 
content is object from the introduction.  
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As second point that I want to make regarding interpretation contradicts Pensky’s 
claim that for Adorno philosophy’s role is to reveal historical truth. As I’ve already 
shown, in my reading of Adorno, the historical moment becomes inaccessible once it 
becomes immanent in the work of art.83 I’ve also shown how for Adorno, 
interpretation of the work of art reveals more about the moment in which the work is 
experienced as opposed to the moment in which it was created. Philosophical 
interpretation works in the same way. We see this idea in the following citation where 
Adorno writes about the role of aesthetics: 
History is immanent to the truth content of aesthetic. For this reason it is the 
task of historico-philosophical analysis of the situation to bring to light in a 
rigorous fashion what was formerly held to be the apriori of aesthetic. The 
aesthetic that is needed today would be the self-consciousness of the truth 
content of what is radically temporal. This clearly demands, as the counterpoint 
to the analysis of the situation, that traditional aesthetic categories be 
confronted with this analysis; it is exclusively this confrontation that brings the 
artistic movement and the movement of the concept into relation.84 
 
In a manner analogous to the interpretation of a theatre piece, philosophical 
interpretation does not open the Zeitkern and re-establish its truth content in a 
historicist manner. In order to understand Adorno’s emphasis on the idea of self-
consciousness of the radically temporal truth, I would again refer to Bernstein’s depiction of 
Adorno’s concept of philosophical interpretation as a form of second reflection that 
uses the work of art as a medium through which to interpret and critique 
contemporary culture.85 Even though philosophical interpretation perceives the 
violence that was to come in European artwork of the 1920s and 1930s, the primary 
task of philosophical interpretation is to perceive the presence of this violence. The 
                                                
83 See note 28 as well as my discussion of the objectivation of the socio-historical moment in Chapter 1 
section 1b. 
84 Adorno, Aesthetic Theory, 357. 
85 See note 81. 
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presence of violence automatically relates to the unbroken objective conditions in which the 
past is still at large and through which any form of memory must work. The notion of 
being able to see the violence that was to come combined with the idea that art 
facilitates a self-reflection might allow us to perceive the violence that could come 
about within our own midst. This possibility will be examined in greater detail in the 
conclusion of this project when I discuss the temporality of the artwork and how this 
temporality relates to memory. 
 
A third and final point that challenges Pensky’s characterization of Adorno’s concept 
of philosophical interpretation relates to the process itself. Pensky’s asserts that 
interpretation provides a solution to the work of art’s riddles. I find this to be 
problematic because for Adorno, while each work is a nexus of a problem,86 a solution to 
these problems does not materialize in the interpretive process. The work of art 
maintains its enigmatic character because the historical truth content that is at its 
core—in other words, its Zeitkern—cannot be deciphered even though one can 
experience the artwork. Adorno gives the analogous example of a rainbow: “If one 
seeks to get a closer look at a rainbow, it disappears.”87 When talking about the 
rainbow one recounts an experience of the rainbow; it is impossible to recount the 
rainbow itself. The answer to the riddle of the artwork does not lie in the artwork 
itself, but rather in the experience of the artwork.  
 
However, as Foster notes, just because the riddle of the artwork cannot be solved 
doesn’t mean that it cannot be dissolved. Foster writes: 
                                                
86 Adorno, Aesthetic Theory, 358. 
87 Ibid, 122.  
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The model of philosophy that Adorno proposes in [The Actuality of Philosophy] is 
that of a form of interpretation, the aim of which is to dissolve what Adorno 
calls ‘riddles’ (1971a, 334-335) The interpreter of riddles, Adorno argues does 
not look at the riddle as the ‘image of being lying behind it,’ […] ‘Genuine 
philosophical interpretation,’ Adorno claims, ‘does not come upon a persisting 
meaning that lies behind the question’; rather it ‘lights it up suddenly and 
consumes it at the same time,” A response of the first sort would be one that 
answered the riddle rather than dissolving it.88 
 
I agree with Foster in his characterization of Adorno’s metaphorical concept of 
interpretation as dissolving rather than solving. In order to explicate the notion of 
interpretation as dissolving riddles, I need to continue with Foster. The continuation 
of the above citation takes his argument one step further and looks at the nature of 
the riddle itself. He writes:  
Genuine philosophical interpretation […] would reveal the riddle as a symptom; 
the riddle is used as the key with which to decode the life conditions that make 
the riddle appear in the first place. This is why interpretation both ‘lights up’ the 
riddle […] and at the same time consumes it – it shows that the idle cannot be 
answered on its own terms because its very appearance is dependent on certain 
features of the life context. The riddle is dissolved because its dependence is 
revealed.89 
 
These citations make three key claims relating to the transcendence of the past 
through the artwork. First, that the riddle is a symptom is another way of looking at the 
work of art’s Zeitkern as a manifestation of the non-identity. In this case we are drawn 
into the interpretation because of the symptom and we end up diagnosing our own 
condition. Second, and this point refers to why we end up diagnosing our own 
condition, not only is there no image behind the riddle for interpretation to light up in 
Foster’s reading of Adorno, interpretation neither gives the ‘meaning’ of the riddle, nor 
                                                
88 Foster Adorno, The Recovery of Experience, 48. For commentary on this see Hohendahl’s discussion of 
the difficulty faced when trying to decode the work of art. He compares it to a hieroglyph for which no 
code exists: “It is the peculiar nature of their linguistic code that they cannot be decoded; they are like 
hieroglyphs whose code is unknown or lost […] [T]he late Adorno emphasizes the enigmatic character 
(Rätselcharakter) of the artwork, its incompatibility with discursive knowledge.” Hohendahl, Prismatic 
Thought, 237.  
89 Foster, Adorno, The Recovery of Experience, 48. 
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does it expose a hidden meaning (Hintersinn).90 Foster’s reading of Adorno’s concepts 
of riddles and interpretation as dissolution rather than solution works in the opposite 
manner. Lighting up, in Foster’s reading is what philosophical interpretation does. The 
illumination of the riddle does not occur when the riddle is solved and a meaning is 
revealed. Instead, both the riddle itself and its “[…] dependence on socio-historical 
experience […]”91 are illuminated thus revealing the riddle as its own solution. In 
other words, there is no fixed or determined solution to the riddle. The riddle 
becomes the perpetual key to unlocking the socio-historical moment in which it finds 
itself. It is for this reason that Foster reads Adorno’s concept of interpretation as 
dissolution and illuminating. The riddle is continuously dissolved throughout history 
each time illuminating a different but connected response. The lighting up and 
dissolution of the riddle inside the work of art that occurs during interpretation 
accounts for the transcendence of the past via the work of art’s mediation.  
 
Foster’s reading of interpretation as dissolving riddles is closer to Adorno’s notion 
that the work of art releases truth content as it decays92 than Pensky’s reading of 
interpretation as solving the riddles. In Foster’s reading, Adorno’s concept of 
interpretation is actually a self-reflective and critical exercise. For Adorno, the work of 
art’s riddle, like the work itself, is both historically contingent and exposed to 
historical time, the dynamics of dissolution and decay are a better characterization 
than a static solution. 
                                                
90 Ibid, 49. Foster also draws parallels between Adorno and Wittgenstein on this matter. 
91 Ibid, 49. 
92 Adorno, Aesthetic Theory, 178. Bernstein describes this decay as the collapse of artwork in history and 
argues that what is important is that which is revealed through art. See Bernstein, Fate of Art, 248-249. 





In order to illustrate this difference and conclude the discussion of riddles and 
interpretation, I want to look at the example of the riddle in two classical instances: 
Oedipus and Penelope.93 Pensky’s concept of philosophy solving the artwork’s riddles 
is similar to that of Oedipus solving the riddle of the Sphinx; for the Sphinx, there is 
only one right answer. The singular response to the Sphinx’s riddle claims to be 
eternal and universal: it is man who walks on four legs in the morning, two legs in the 
afternoon, and three legs in the evening. The Sphinx’s concept of the riddle does not 
correspond to Adorno’s concept of the riddle, because for Adorno the riddle of the 
artwork is a problem without a solution, let alone one particular response to it. 
 
By contrast, Foster’s conception of the riddle is more like Adorno’s. This can be 
illustrated by examining another example of a riddle from antiquity: Penelope’s riddle 
or testing of Odysseus. Penelope challenges the man claiming to be her husband by 
testing his knowledge of their intimate secrets. Penelope and Odysseus’s bed, carved 
from an olive tree growing through their bedroom, is unmoveable without destroying 
the bed itself, and in so doing, the space that conditions their intimacy. When 
Penelope asks him to move their bed into the hall, Odysseus is enraged. His fury 
dissolves her doubt; the man before her can be none other than the only other person 
privy to the bed’s secret.94 Penelope’s concept of the riddle does correspond to 
                                                
93 Please note two things: first that I’m using the term ‘riddle’ a bit literally. While the riddle of the 
Sphinx is undeniably a riddle, the ‘riddle’ that Penelope uses to ascertain the authenticity of Odysseus’ 
identity claim is less a traditional riddle and more a test. I am using the idea of the riddle as a test in 
order to show how, for Adorno, the riddle or test does not have one right answer. Second, the riddle 
of the Sphinx is not fully articulated in Sophocles’ work, though the riddle itself is well known and has 
come to us through many other sources such as Apollodorus.  
94 See Homer, The Odyssey, 447-448. The test is the main subject oft Book Twenty-Three: The Trunk of 
the Old Olive Tree. 
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Adorno’s concept of the riddle, because the dissolution of the riddle illuminates both 
the riddle (how do I know that you are who you say you are) and the solution (I will 
show you that I am myself). That Odysseus and Penelope’s bed had its own particular 
secret makes the nature of the riddle different from the Sphinx’s riddle that has one 
universal and eternal answer.  
 
The juxtaposition of these two kinds of riddles demonstrates one fundamental point 
with regards to Adorno’s concept of deciphering the work of art. When Oedipus 
gives the Sphinx the anticipated solution to her riddle, she opens the border of 
Thebes for him. He is thus unknowingly doomed to his own particular fate as the one 
who murders his father and sleeps with his mother. Even if other people solve the 
Sphinx’s riddle they do not doom themselves to Oedipus’s fate. The Sphinx’s riddle 
has a universal solution that unlocks a particular condition. Conversely, when 
Odysseus dissolves Penelope’s riddle thus exposing his true self, she opens the border 
of their bed for him. He thus knowingly assumes his own particular fate as her 
husband. No one else could have solved her riddle, however, while Odysseus and 
Penelope’s bed has its own particular secret, it stands for the universal condition of all 
beds having their own particular secrets. Odysseus’ riddle solving, and the riddle itself, 
illuminates the condition of secrets and trust in the sphere of the intimate. While 
interpretation cannot discern the secrets of this particular bed, interpretation can read 
this as a moment of intimacy that permits us to reflect on our own intimate 
experiences. Whereas the Oedipus example illustrates the idea of how solving a 
universal riddle can unlock a particular fate, the Odysseus example illustrates the idea 




Adorno’s concept of interpretation as the dissolution of the work of art’s riddles is 
analogous to the Odysseus example. When interpreting the socio-historical truth in 
the artwork, we cannot get inside its Zeitkern. However, reflecting on this moment 
gives us insight into our own socio-historical context. As with Penelope’s particular 
riddle that only Odysseus can answer illuminating the concept of intimacy, the 
historical suffering within the work of art helps us to see suffering in our own midst. 
Thus the work of art, like a riddle, invites a self-reflection that mediates our 
relationship to the past. 
 
II Conclus ion  
This chapter has developed the idea that transcendence of the past via the work of art 
is linked with its privileged position that invites interpretation. The work of art’s 
transcendent function is that of mediation between two temporalities, the temporality 
of the artwork (the past) and the temporality of the interpretation (the present). 
Adorno’s concept of interpretation offers a vision of a relationship between riddle 
and interpretation where by being impenetrable, the riddle itself casts light on the 
ciphers of the present world. For Adorno, the transcendence of the past through its 
immanence in the work of art has to do with its ability to illuminate the presence of 
the past in various institutions of contemporary culture. It is through this process of 
illumination that the past is transcended via the mediation of the work of art.  
 
Furthermore, this interpretation takes the form of self-reflection. This transcendence 
depends upon Adorno’s notion that the past is both preserved and negated in the 
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work of art thus allowing interpretation to occur without disturbing the work’s 
original Zeitkern, by becoming a Zeitkern itself within history. Because the work of art 
has an intact Zeitkern and is a Zeitkern, in other words, because the work of art 
contains history and is in history, the work of art gives the past a presence. The past is 
not preserved as something sacred, static, or dead, rather the past is given the space 
necessary to be a dynamic force. Just as the preservation and negation processes 
utilize the dual character of the work of art as both autonomous entity as well as a fait 
social, our reactions to the work of art and interpretations of the work of art stem 
from both autonomous and socially constrained places. However, while we are 
conditioned by our respective socio-historical constraints, the work of art calls to the 
potential autonomous subjectivity within every individual engaging with the work.95 In 
this way the work of art mediates memory work while both respecting the dynamic 
presence and continuous influence of the past, and fostering the sort of subjectivity 
that Adorno saw as the only possible way to prevent the continuous and perpetual 
return to barbarism.  
 
The possibility of the work of art acting as the mediating third term in a temporal 
equation between the past and how it is worked through in the present is fundamental 
to Adorno’s conception of memory. Because of its ability to preserve and negate the 
                                                
95 Adorno’s identification of subjectivity as a problem (the weak I, the lack of an autonomous subject), 
remains an important social and philosophical question. One suggestion, recently posed by Iain 
Macdonald in his article “Cold, cold, warm: Autonomy, intimacy and maturity in Adorno,” highlights 
the Adornian notion of participation in the warmth of things, or intimacy, as a condition of possibility for 
subjectivity. Macdonald cites a dialectical relationship between autonomy and intimacy in Adorno’s 
work. I wonder if the objectivation of the past via the work of art might be an example of participation in 
the warmth of things. Perhaps the expression of the past in the work of art and the subsequent temporal 
presence it achieves fulfils Macdonald’s description of expressivity in Adorno as “[…] objectively 
mediated subjectivity [that] can smash through the façades of the status quo.” Iain Macdonald, “Cold, 
cold, warm: Autonomy, intimacy and maturity in Adorno,” in Philosophy & Social Criticism 37(6), (April 
2011), pp. 669-689, 679. 
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past, the work of art is an effective response to the question of memory as working 
through (Aufarbeitung) the past. In order to see how this transpires, we will spend the 
next chapter engaging in a reading of two works of art. Because it anticipates staging 
which means that the text is always brought to the reader by an interpretation, the 
piece of theatre is an ideal way of looking at interpretation because it must be 
interpreted. I will look at two plays, Becket’s Endgame and Brecht’s Threepenny Opera. 
Adorno wrote extensively on these authors and views them as polar opposites when it 
comes to Aufarbeitung der Vegangenheit.  
 
 
Chapter Three: “Denn wovon lebt  der  Mensch?” (What keeps mankind alive?): 
Adorno, Beckett, and Brecht 
 
This chapter will examine Adorno’s concept of how the sublation of the past in and 
by the work of art is a form of memory work by giving a reading of Adorno’s reading 
of Beckett’s Endgame and Brecht’s Threepenny Opera. The examination will allow me to 
conclude this project because it will evaluate both the philosophical framework I 
established in the previous two chapters and how it resonates when confronted with 
the aesthetic experience. The close examination of these two very different examples 
will show how art can engage in memory work when it preserves and negates the past 
and functions as a mediation for the past’s transcendence. It will also show how 
dangerous the work of art becomes when it fails to meet the above criteria.  
 
The hypothesis of this chapter is a reiteration of the thesis of this entire study: the 
work of art sublates the past and in so doing, works through it. This chapter will 
demonstrate that the more a work of art strives to engage critically with the socio-
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historical moment in which it is created, the less it is able to attain its autonomy. So 
while the ‘engaged’ work of art can be thought of as a fait social and as critical, 
engagement precludes the kind of negation that is necessary to allow for the past in 
the work to transcend. Preservation without negation prevents transcendence from 
occurring. Taken into the context of this investigation: Brecht’s Threepenny Opera 
leaves no room for interpretation and thus while the past has a presence, its presence 
is that of a relic that is closely aligned with the eternal return to barbarism. The piece 
that is effective when it comes to memory work, Beckett’s Endgame, is able to preserve 
and negate the past, and thus serves as a medium for its transcendence. The 
examination of the two pieces of theatre will give us final insight into the nature of 
this memory work. We will be able to see why it is imperative work for Adorno and 
why the work of art is the best means through which it can take place. 
 
Clearly there are many difficulties with the examples I have chosen to investigate. As 
such, this chapter will not be a strict comparison or even an analysis of a general 
Brecht vs. Beckett scenario. Instead, I am focusing on several points Adorno makes 
about these two pieces. I have chosen these two plays for several reasons: first they 
are plays, second, Adorno writes about them, and third, these are the most 
performed, indicative, and cultural relevant of the authors’ works. On the first point, 
as already indicated in the previous chapter pieces of theatre and music both and 
necessitate a double form of interpretation. The way in which these pieces may be and 
are interpreted will prove to be one of the major differences between them. On the 
second point, Adorno’s writing on Beckett and Brecht partially anchor the larger 
engaged art vs. autonomous art debate that underscores much of his writing on art 
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and aesthetics. On the final point, because they are the most performed, we can 
assume a sort of contemporary cultural resonance. Audiences sat down to these 
pieces when they were respectively written and continue to sit down to these pieces 
today. The very different ways in which Endgame and The Threepenny Opera function 
exemplify why one piece is a successful sublation of the past and the other fails in this 
regard to dangerous effect. 
 
In fact, it is the very reasons why these pieces are difficult to compare that allow me 
to argue that Beckett’s Endgame performs a sort of Adornian memory work and 
Brecht’s Threepenny Opera does not. I consider these main differences to be three 
caveats that I must announce before launching into the chapter: first, the particular 
socio-historical moment in which the pieces were written (one in Weimar and one 
post-World War II France); second, the material of the pieces (one is a collaborative 
musical re-working of John Gay’s The Beggars’ Opera, while the other is a sparse play); 
and third, interpretation (one encourages being set in different times and contexts and 
the other has very strict stage directions and eschews all variations). Looking at these 
caveats will allow me to structure this chapter along the following lines: preservation 
of the socio-historical context, negation and critique, and transcendence as 
interpretation. 
 
I Preservat ion:  Saying (Engagement)  vs .  Express ing (Autonomy) 
The contexts in which The Threepenny Opera and Endgame were written are utterly 
different and yet not entirely at odds: in The Threepenny Opera, one can read echoes of 
the catastrophe in whose aftermath Endgame is set. Brecht and Weill wrote The 
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Threepenny Opera in Berlin in 1928. It was the height of the roaring twenties during the 
decadent years of the Weimar Republic. There was hyperinflation, the American stock 
market was about to crash, and the Nazis had begun their rise to power and 
prominence. Beckett’s Endgame premiered in London in 1957. Like The Threepenny 
Opera, Endgame was written between and during wars. The Second World War had 
finished with the dropping of Fat Man and Little Boy over Hiroshima and Nagasaki, 
The Cold War was in full swing (though it clearly hadn’t reached it zenith), and 
further nuclear war certainly loomed as a possibility. This section will look at how the 
two works of art preserve the socio-historical moment that imbues their particular 
Zeitkern. The concept of preservation takes us into Adorno’s discussion of engaged art 
vs. autonomous art. 
 
While Adorno’s main target in his 1962 Commitment piece is Sartre,96 he does level 
heavy criticism at Brecht. The crux of Adorno’s critique of Brecht’s commitment relates 
to how his work preserves the socio-historical moment, or, using the terminology I 
have been developing, how the work preserves the Zeitkern of the work of art. I want 
to look at two things that Adorno says relating to the question of how the past is 
preserved in the committed work. I will give both of the citations and then analyze 
them. First: 
                                                
96 See Adorno, “Commitment,” in Notes to Literature Volume Two (the page references are in 
parentheses). The first half of the essay verges on the polemical against Sartre. Adorno claims that 
political engagement in art is either ambiguous or propaganda (77). He attacks Sartre specifically on 
several grounds: first the contradiction between his scepticism in literature’s ability to effect change and 
the overtly pedagogical tone of his work (80), second the appropriation of Sartre’s philosophical works 
and phrases like “Hell is other people” by the culture industry (81), third the banal and dangerous 
nature of these phrases that could be co-opted by any regimes including his mortal enemies (81). Though 
Adorno does not directly make the point in this essay, the schism between what Sartre said and what 
he did resulting in an incoherent life could also be grounds on which to condemn him and his work. 
See for example: “The rough-and-tumble adolescent masculinity of the young Brecht already betrays 
the false courage of the intellectual who, out of despair about violence, short-sightedly goes over to a 
violent praxis of which he has every reason to be afraid.” (86-87) 
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What weighs heaviest against commitment in art is that even good intentions 
sound a false note when they are noticeable; they do so all the more when they 
disguise themselves because of that. There is some of this even in the later 
Brecht, in the linguistic gesture of wisdom, the fiction of the old peasant 
saturated with epic experience as the poetic subject.97  
 
Second: 
In Germany commitment in art amounts primarily to parroting what everybody 
is saying, or at least what everybody would like to hear. Hidden in the notion of 
a ‘message,’ of art’s manifesto, even if it is politically radical, is a moment of 
accommodation to the world; the gesture of addressing the listener contains a 
secret complicity with those being addressed, which can, however, be released 
from their illusions only if that complicity is rescinded.98  
 
This criticism of Brecht and committed art can be summed up by the following 
statement: the more a work tries to show an audience a particular reflection of itself, 
the more the image ends up either coming across as precious, or showing the viewers 
exactly what they want to see. In both cases the image is affirmative, either one 
already agrees or one will never be convinced.99 Also in both cases, the image fails to 
inhere and subsequently to reflect the subtleties of what is really going on in a 
particular socio-historical moment.  
 
The citations above convey two of Adorno’s two of thoughts on committed art: the 
first is that good intentions ring false, and the second is that committed art tells the 
audience what they want to hear. Both of these thoughts lead to the conclusion that 
the committed work of art misses the point. In telling the audience what it wants to 
hear, or, by holding up an image of society that is a projection rather than a piece of 
society, the preservation taking place in the committed work of art’s Zeitkern actually 
                                                
97 Ibid,  87. 
98 Ibid, 93. 
99 See Adorno’s comment: “The demeanour of the didactic drama recalls the American expression 
‘preaching to the saved.” Adorno, Notes to Literature Volume Two, 84. 
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works against the intention of the artwork. The more the artist tries to force or 
engage the audience with images of the socio-historical moment, the more this 
depiction becomes a projection rather than an instantiation. The art image then 
becomes an exaggeration or a caricature. Even more importantly, the image The 
Threepenny Opera holds before the audience is one where they do not find themselves 
implicated. In this image the capitalists are the bad guys, the murderers are the heroes, 
and the system is to blame for all of this. In other words, the audience does not see 
itself reflected in the image of the piece. This is an example of the danger resulting 
from the incomplete negation I discussed in chapter one. The danger is that it 
becomes easy for the audience to respond by saying they are evil, and I am exonerated 
from the possibility of evil because I agree with this play. This I is an example of what 
Adorno meant by the idea of the weak subject, a theme that is everywhere in his 
work, but very specifically referenced in The Meaning of Working Through the Past. 100 
From this reference we can infer that Brecht’s didactic plays only exacerbate this 
problem. Put in the context of Adorno’s theories surrounding the Zeitkern, we see that 
what is preserved about the socio-historical context of the Weimar Republic is in fact 
its failure. In hindsight and retrospect we can clearly read the traces of what was to 
come but the question is could those in the audience anticipate the catastrophe?  
 
If The Threepenny Opera provides an example of the ability of engaged art to preserve 
the socio-historical moment only in its failure, then Endgame provides an example of 
how autonomous art preserves the socio-historical moment in its success. Adorno 
argues that rather than saying what everyone wants to hear and thus ringing somehow 
                                                
100 See Adorno, Critical Models, 91, 94, 111. 
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false, Beckett’s Endgame says the unsayable by expressing the socio-historical moment 
about which nothing can really be said, because there is nothing to say. He writes: 
“[…] everyone shrinks from [Beckett’s work] in horror, and yet none can deny that 
these eccentric novels and plays are about things everyone knows and no one wants 
to talk about.”101 Adorno sums up the difference between Beckett and Brecht in the 
following passage:  
Beckett’s ecce homo is what has become of human beings […] All commitment to 
the world has to be cancelled if the idea of the committed work of art is to be 
fulfilled, the polemical alienation that Brecht the theoretician had in mind, and 
that he practiced less and less the more he devoted himself sociably to the 
human. This paradox, which may sound too clever, does not require much 
support from philosophy. It is based on an extremely simple experience: 
Kafka’s process and Becketts’s plays and his genuinely colossal novel The 
Unnamable have an effect in comparison to which official works of committed 
art look like children’s games – they arouse the anxiety that existentialism only 
talks about. In dismantling illusion they explode art from the outside, hence 
only illusorily. Their implacability compels the change in attitude that 
committed works only demand.102 
 
The difference between the work of art incarnating and then reflecting what everyone 
wants to hear and what everyone knows but cannot or won’t say is profound and cuts 
to the heart of the confrontation between engaged and autonomous art. While both 
engaged and autonomous art preserve their particular socio-historical moments as 
their Zeitkern, whereas the autonomous work expresses this moment via a mimetic 
process, the engaged work only expresses the moment indirectly. The moment is 
expressed in the schism between the simplified and normative vision of reality 
espoused in the piece and its placid reception by the audience.  
 
                                                
101 Adorno, Notes to Literature, 90. 
102 Ibid, 90. 
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In one sense, the post-catastrophic world that is the Zeitkern in Beckett’s Endgame and 
the pre-catastrophic world that echoes in the Zeitkern of Brecht’s Threepenny Opera are 
linked by their relationship to the catastrophe. In another sense, these two pieces of 
theatre function completely differently. While we can retrospectively see the 
catastrophe to come in The Threepenny Opera, we read it not in the blatant intention of 
Brecht’s text but rather in its miscalculation. In attempting to simultaneously alienate 
and educate the audience by telling them what they wanted to hear he only managed 
to implicate them without their knowledge or acceptance. Beckett’s Endgame, on the 
other hand, preserves the past because it is both of and, as we shall see in the next 
section, against the socio-historical moment. Whereas the autonomous art cannot but 
preserve, that which is preserved in and by the engaged work is its failure. In the next 
section of this chapter I will examine the nature of this failure by looking closer at the 
question of negation in the works. 
 
II Negat ion:  Cri t ique o f  Cri t ique 
The previous section looked at how the past was preserved in The Threepenny Opera 
and Endgame. This section looks at how these two theatre pieces negate the past via 
critique. I will show that while both pieces manage to preserve the past, only Endgame 
negates it when judging the works by the criteria of Adorno’s concept of critique. On 
the flipside, The Threepenny Opera could be criticized using this criterion because in not 
achieving what it sets out to achieve, Brecht’s engaged art ends up reproducing the 
very logic that it is trying to criticize. One of the ways in which to examine how the 
work of art criticizes and in so doing, negates the socio-historical moment that it 
preserves is to look at the fundamental question it poses and how this question is 
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posed. I would like to conduct this examination in the cases of The Threepenny Opera 
and Endgame. 
 
Recalling how Adorno claims that Brecht’s work preaches to the saved 103and tells the 
audience what they want to hear104 we can look at the two main claims Brecht makes 
in The Threepenny Opera. Brecht’s main claims take the form of questions. Both 
questions (and responses) come during the finales of various acts of the opera. The 
first question comes at the second act with the Ballade Über die Frage wovon lebt der 
Mensch, usually translated as Ballad About the Question: What Keeps Mankind Alive. The 
second question comes towards the end of the third act ends when a soon-to-be-
executed Macheath asks: “What’s breaking into a bank compared with founding a 
bank?”105 Both questions have implicit and contained answers. The first question is 
answered in the ballad when Macheath and the Chorus describe how man lives first 
by eating and then later comes die Moral. Furthermore, since there really isn’t enough 
to eat, or rather because of social organization so many people do not get enough to 
eat, mankind does not live by morals. In response to the question “Denn wovon lebt 
der Mensch” (What keeps mankind alive?) the Chorus’ response is: “Ihr Herren, 
bildet euch nur da nichts ein,/Der Mensch lebt nur von Missetat allein!”106 
(Gentlemen, don’t fool yourselves, mankind lives by evil deeds alone). The answer to 
                                                
103 See note 99. 
104 See notes 97-98. 
105 Macheath also asks: “What’s a jemmy compared with a share certificate? […]What’s murdering a 
man compared with employing a man? Bertolt Brecht, Collected Plays: 2, ed. J. Willett and R. Manheim, 
(London: Methuen Drama World Classics, 2010), 166. 
106 Ibid, 145-146. This is usually translated as follows:  And now for once you must try to face the facts. 
Mankind is kept alive by bestial acts” – this is not a particularly accurate translation. The translators 
were charged with finding a way of rendering the sentence and sentiment that matched the flow and 
rhythm of the music. I think that a more appropriate translation would be something to the effect of: 
“Gentlemen, don’t fool yourselves - mankind lives by evil deeds alone.” Thanks to Agata Lisiak, 
Florian Duijsens, and Kathrin Bimesdörfer for help with the translation. 
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the second question is implicit in the structure, characterization, and content of the 
play: clearly the capitalists are the most evil criminals.  
 
Putting these two questions and answers together demonstrates how Brecht’s text 
fails to meet Adorno’s criteria of critique and negation. Brecht’s work poses rhetorical 
questions whose answers are obvious and almost catechistic. This is not the negation 
and critique that Adorno deems necessary for the creation of the dialectical image and 
the sublation that must take place in order for the past to be worked through. Similar 
to his critique of Sartre’s “hell is other people,”107 Adorno claims that the hybrid 
formed by the conflation of philosophy and didactic art in Brecht cannot negate 
because it actually affirms its particular socio-historical order. In celebrating the poor 
and creating new and glamorous working class heroes out of shady underworld 
figures, Brecht does not go far enough in his critique of the system. Instead, he finds 
and confirms new figureheads for a new world order. This is because Brecht’s cast of 
characters, whether they are beggars, murderers, prostitutes, or the aristocracy of the 
underclass, perform the roles of heroic archetypes. Even if these characters are not 
traditional heroes, they are still heroes; they follow the logic of heroism even if their 
nature appears at first to subvert it. Brecht’s text misses a point that Beckett makes 
very eloquently, there really are no heroes. For example, even though Brecht’s 
Macheath is clearly not the dapper bandit from Gay’s The Beggar’s Opera, caught in the 
sway of his Morität, famously added days before opening night at the request of lead 
                                                
107 Adorno writes about how Sartre’s plays essentially masquerade as weakly argued philosophical 
arguments which could by their very nature be consumed as any other cultural product: “The 
conjunction of readily graspable plots – and distillable ideas has brought Sartre great success and made 
him, certainly against his own intentions, acceptable to the culture industry.” Adorno, Notes to Literature 
Volume Two, 81. 
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actor Harald Paulsen, the audience cannot help but be on the side of Macheath and 
experiencing relief when the Gilbert and Sullivanesque messenger rides in with his 
pardon after being announced by the disappointed but unfazed beggar king 
Peachum.108 Alex Ross characterizes Brecht’s Macheath as a mixture of Doyle’s 
Professor Moriarty and Lang’s Dr. Mabuse. However, he also argues that Macheath 
represents an underside of the Weimar Republic, that which he calls the fascination with 
masterminds109 Ross argues that Hitler’s use of the image of the plotting Jew, could 
easily be read in Brecht’s Macheath.110 The audience remains firmly on the side of 
Macheath, while clearly the political mechanism of Germany in the 1930s was not on 
the side of the seeming conspirator. Why this schism?  
 
As already mentioned in the discussion of how the work preserves the past, The 
Threepenny Opera presents the audience with an affirmative image even though it 
pretends to present a form of critique. In suggesting that the real criminal is the one 
who founds the bank and the real enemy is the capitalist social order, the work is 
merely preserving and affirming a particular engaged response to a socio-historical 
moment. This moment is not impressed upon the work in the manner in which Adorno 
argues takes place in negation. Instead, the work is an obvious construction of social 
reality. Because it feeds them what they want to hear, the result does not shock the 
                                                
108 At the beginning of the scene Peachum ironically says: “Since this is opera, not life, you’ll see Justice 
give way before humanity.” Brecht, The Threepenny Opera, 168. 
109 Alex Ross, The Rest is Noise: listening to the twentieth century, (New York: Picador Farrar, Strauss, and 
Giroux, 2007), 209. 
110 Ibid, 209. 
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audience into seeing what is really going on and thus The Threepenny Opera cannot be 
said to meet Adorno’s criteria for negation.111  
 
What I have been arguing both in the previous section and in the beginning of this 
section is that The Threepenny Opera preserves the failure of the Weimar Republic by 
its own failure to negate the past because it is an engaged work of art. What I want 
to show now is that only an autonomous work of art actually succeeds in negating 
the past. Adorno’s reading of Beckett’s Endgame will provide the material for this 
argument. The end results will show how important negation is in terms of the 
work of art’s ability to sublate and thus work through the past.  
 
If the main reason why The Threepenny Opera does not meet Adorno’s criteria for 
negation is that in attempting to engage critically with the socio-hisorical moment it 
actually affirms it, in other words, it is purely a fait social, the main reason why Endgame 
does meet these criteria is that it is both a fait social and autonomous. The work’s 
autonomy manifests in how it uses questions. Unlike in the case of Brecht’s two main 
questions, Beckett’s text is filled with mundane seeming questions such as: 
What’s the weather like?/Same as usual112  
                                                
111 Shock or shudder is an important aspect of creating a critical response to the work of art (see 
Adorno, Aesthetic Theory, 245). However, if Adorno finds consummate fault with Brecht on this matter, 
he is less dogmatically against Weill. In his 1929 piece on The Threepenny Opera, Adorno writes about 
interesting things that take place in the music itself. While the music seems at first glance to be 
hummable and easily consumable, it actually does attempt to subvert the culture industry. See Hinton’s 
translation of Adorno’s article on The Threepenny Opera: “Weill, who sees things from here and now, 
from the other side and from a three-dimensional perspective, against the background of things past, 
must, as it were, composed out in full what time has sketched on the face of those things in our 
consciousness. The bygone melodies are broken, and we hear their metrical regimentation as the 
piecing-together of fragments; in order to interpret old melodies, Weill composes his new ones, 
fragmentarily pieces together the debris of the empty phrases shattered by time.” Stephen Hinton (ed), 
Kurt Weill: The Threepenny Opera, Cambridge Opera Handbook, (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 
1990), 131. Much of the short article is devoted to exploring these aspects of the work.  
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How are your legs?/Bad113  
It isn’t a ray of sunshine I feel on my face?/No/Am I very white? […] Not more 
so than usual114  
 
Unlike the inbuilt responses to Brecht’s grand questions, there are no real profound 
and meaningful responses to Hamm and Clov’s questions. Adorno focuses on the 
particular example of Hamm asking Clov when he looks out the window through his 
telescope if it is already night to which he responds no. The follow up question is then 
what is it. Clov’s response, including Beckett’s stage directions, is: “Grey (Lowering the 
telescope, turning towards Hamm, louder.) Grey! (Pause. Still louder.) GRREY.”115 
Grey seems to stand in for a sort of non-answer, and ambiguity, a void in which there 
is no meaning. This void of meaning underscores the ontological and empirical 
realms.116   
 
For Adorno, this void accomplishes what the affirmative and engaged work cannot 
accomplish: it preserves the socio-historical moment by negating it, or in other words, 
in negatively expressing the inexpressible. I am using the concept negative expression 
that I developed in the chapter on negation whereby artistic expression is a negative 
imprint of the social world. In comparing Endgame with engaged art, Adorno writes:  
                                                
112 Samuel Beckett, Endspiel.. Fin de partie Endgame (Dreisprache Ausgabe), trans. S. Beckett and E. 
Tophoven, (Frankfurt: Suhrkamp Taschenbuch, 1974), 42. 
113 Ibid, 52. 
114 Ibid, 90. 
115 Adorno references this in his essay “Understanding Endgame,” Notes to Literature Volume One, trans. 
S. Weber Nicholsen, (New York: Columbia University Press, 199), 247. Please note that the page 
reference he gives, 31, is for another edition. Ross suggests that Weill’s music expresses the tension of 
the Weimar Republic in the following manner: “’Mack the Knife’ is a song chained to one chord. It’s a 
pop tune with no exit.” Ross, The Rest is Noise, 209. 
116 For Adorno’s discussion regarding the lack of meaning in ontological realm see Adorno, Notes to 
Literature Volume One, 247. For Adorno’s discussion regarding the lack of meaning in the empirical 
realm see  his discussion on Beckttian situation as the: “[…] the photographic negative of a reality 
referred to meaning.” Adorno, Notes to Literature Volume One, 253, This notion is conveyed in the 
following sequence from Endgame: “Hamm: We’re not beginning to…to…mean something? Clov: Mean 
something! You and I mean something! Brief laugh. Ah that’s a good one!” Becket, Endgame, 48 
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Playing with elements of reality without any mirroring, taking no stand and 
finding pleasure in this freedom from prescribed activity, exposes more than 
would taking a stand with the intent to expose. The name of the catastrophe is 
to be spoken only in silence.117 
 
Adorno also writes: 
The violence of the unspeakable is mirrored in the fear of mentioning it. 
Beckett keeps it nebulous. About what is incommensurable with experience as 
such one can speak only in euphemisms, the way one speaks in Germany of the 
murder of the Jews.118 
 
Endgame’s void both expresses the inexpressible, and says what everyone knows but 
no one can or will say. This expression is the preservation by negation that is 
fundamental in terms of the creation of the dialectical image. Art that engages directly 
and attempts to speak the name of the catastrophe cannot express it negatively 
because it attempts to fill the void; Endgame’s questions do not have answers in the 
same manner in which The Threepenny Opera’s questions do. The piece is a part of our 
inability to answer these questions and the impotence the audience feels when faced 
with the unfathomable catastrophe expressed in the play expresses our general sense 
and condition of impotence. There is no happy ending.119 In fact there is no ending at 
all even if the piece itself is called Endgame. The play can never really finish, just because 
there is currently no answer to the questions it raises. 
 
The negation that is necessary for the creation of the dialectical image involves a void, 
a sort of negative space and the ultimate inability to fill it. As was argued in the 
previous chapter, philosophy and interpretation is needed in order for the past that is 
                                                
117 Adorno, Notes to Literature Volume One, 248-249. 
118 Ibid, 245-246. 
119 One might consider the ending of The Threepenny Opera to be happy, Polly Peachum expresses this 
sentiment: “Reprieved, My dearest Macheath is reprieved. I’m so happy.” Brecht, The Threepenny Opera,, 
169. Though this sounds like a happy sentiment the somewhat grand and then truncated melody with 
which it is sung suggests otherwise. Furthermore, Polly has just abandoned Macheath earlier on in the 
scene with all his money safely in a Manchester account.  
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immanent in the work to be transcended via the work. In his reading of the oncoming 
catastrophe in The Threepenny Opera and the fallout of the catastrophe in Endgame, 
Adorno does not reduce the fundament problem to the question: who is worse, the 
bank owners or bank robbers? For Adorno our participation and implication in the 
logic of capitalism and exchange means that the problem is that we are all robbers and 
that we cannot recognize ourselves as such. Also problematic is Brecht’s suggestion 
that the bank robber might in fact be a hero because the bank robber is as much a 
tainted by capitalism as the bank owner. For Brecht, the escape from the logic of the 
capitalist system is made possible by way of the bank robber. On the other hand, 
there is really no escape from Endgame, as made even more clear by the man in the 
desert in Acte sans paroles. For Adorno, Beckett’s critique is real negation and Brecht’s 
is only another manifestation of the same logic that structures the capitalist system.  
 
In the previous section, I argued that The Threepenny Opera preserves the failure of 
the Weimar republic by its own failure and that Endgame preserves the sense of 
meaninglessness that pervades a post-catastrophic situation. In this section I 
showed how only Endgame’s preservation is actually a form of negation because 
Brecht injects his play with affirmative meaning. As we shall see in the final section 
of this chapter, there is a danger when the injection of meaning fills the void where 
interpretation and transcendence ought to take place in order for the past to be 
worked through. 
 
III Transcendence :  Interpretat ion 
This final section looks at the last element of sublation, transcendence, and will allow 
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me to show how Endgame engages in memory work and The Threepenny Opera does not. 
Essentially, I will show how because Brecht’s work does not actually negate the socio-
historical moment, it fails to mediate dialectical transcendence. Beckett’s work does 
not have this problem and is therefore successful. 
 
Recalling the chapter on transcendence and the introduction to this chapter where I 
stated that the main differences between the pieces in question are also the main 
reasons why one successfully mediates the sublation of the past and the other does 
not, leads me to the final difference between them: interpretation. On the one hand, 
Brecht’s pieces are constantly interpreted in the sense that every production is set in a 
different time, with a different look, using different translations, and directorial 
choices. However, given that the piece has built in answers to its questions, no real 
interpretative work can be done. As already discussed there is only one answer – evil 
deeds - to the question: what keeps mankind alive. Either we accept this (as Brecht 
wants us to) and we say, yes, in general mankind does, or we say no. The way we 
choose is not really that relevant to any sort of philosophical interpretation of the 
piece as there is really nothing to interpret.  
 
On the other hand, while Beckett’s piece has rigid stage directions and can only be 
played in one manner,120 Endgame does not have one philosophical meaning. In fact, 
as already discussed, it has no identifiable, specific meaning at all. The world outside 
                                                
120 Part of obtaining the rights to a Beckett play is to guarantee that one will not make any changes to 
the script including artistic choices. For example, the first renowned production to successfully cast 
women as Vladamir and Estragon in Waiting for Godot took place in 2006. It was challenged and 




the room in which Hamm and Clov are suspended is grey. There are no black and 
white absolutes, there are neither heroes nor archetypes (not even in seemingly 
reversed forms as with Brecht), there is no way out and there is nothing outside. The 
suspension and inability to re-cast the piece in particular temporal or aesthetic space 
gives it the sense of being frozen. In a manner analogous to Adorno’s concept of the 
Zeitkern, it is this frozenness and impenetrability that allows for Endgame to act as a 
mediating entity. Mindful of the grey post-catastrophic time in which it was written, 
the viewer uses the artwork to reflect on the catastrophes in which we currently find 
ourselves.  
 
It is the ambiguity and the half-light that draws the viewer into the suspension and 
invites philosophical interpretation. In this manner, the riddle of the artwork is close 
to Penelope’s riddle for Odysseus: it challenges every audience member to read the 
concept of meaninglessness for themselves in the work. As with Penelope’s asking 
Odysseus to move the bed, the questions posed during the play are quotidian, fairly 
universal, and simple. However, there are no universal answers. Whatever response 
the play solicits is neither embedded nor implicit. The response is ephemeral and 
contingent. Endgame will always challenge us to try to understand it. Conversely, the 
riddle of The Threepenny Opera is similar to the riddle of the Sphinx: there is one eternal 
universal solution to this problem. There is neither room nor space for the audience 
to engage with the engaged art because their minds are filled with dogmatic, totalizing 
images that obliterate the capacity and need for interpretation. The varying artistic 
interpretations of the play simply confirm this Brechtian pronouncement to 
continuously be true. Imagine for a moment someone standing at the front of the 
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stage and saying the atomic bomb was bad, or Auschwitz was bad. All people can say is “yes, 
it was,” or, worse, “no, it wasn’t.” But frankly, if one didn’t hold this point of view 
when the curtain rises, there is no way that Brecht’s work will change any minds. 
 
The difference between the two works of art where it comes to solving riddles and 
interpretation is critical when considering how the work of art mediates our 
relationship to the past. Even though there is artistic, sociological, and historical work 
to be done on The Threepenny Opera, no serious philosophical interpretive work is 
possible. As such, the past does not have a mediated presence. In interpreting 
Endgame Beckett’s past manifests itself as still present; we see it in our own 
unfathomable institutions, our prejudice, our totalities, and our moments of 
hopelessness. We have to name it for ourselves. There are no characters standing at 
the front of the stage doing our mourning and our work for us. The play gives us 
neither solutions nor meaning. There is more meaning to be found in the 
meaninglessness, and more work to be done. The real response to the catastrophe for 
Beckett is not that mankind lives by evil deeds, but rather than mankind does not, and 
perhaps cannot, live at all. In fact this corresponds more closely to Adorno’s epigraph 
to Mimima Moralia: “Wrong life cannot be lived rightly.”121 For this reason, Endgame 
fulfils Adorno’s criteria as a means through which the past is worked through and 
sublated.  
 
Conclusion to Chapter  Three :  
                                                
121 Adorno, Minima Moralia, 39. 
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This chapter has taken a look at how two pieces of art about which Adorno 
comments extensively work through the past. The successful piece, Endgame, manages 
to sublate the past because in preserving the socio-historical moment via negation, it 
mediates transcendence by inviting interpretation. The failing piece, The Threepenny 
Opera, does not sublate the past because, while it preserves the socio-historical 
moment, it does not really engage in negation. This causes a lack of interpretive 
possibility. The past that is trapped inside the piece is doomed to be repeated as 
artistic interpretations of The Threepenny Opera continue to effect audiences in a similar 
manner: they both preach to the converted, and do not convert the non-believers.  
 
Engaged art does not actually facilitate engagement with the work’s Zeitkern. The lack 
of space for engagement is due to the inability of the work of art to mediate 
transcendence and act as a temporal fulcrum which gives the past a respectful 
presence but also facilitates the means for its eventual being worked through. 
Autonomous art furnishes these means. It is for this reason that Adorno continuously 




In concluding this study, I would like to consider the meaning and significance of the 
work of art’s ability as a dialectical image that both has and is a Zeitkern to sublate the 
past. The meaning and significance stems from the complexities of the work of art’s 
particular temporality. Revealing the presence of the past, un-forgetting per se, allows 
for the possibility to predict possible futures. This is due to the work of art’s double 
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temporality where time is immanent to the work and the work is transcendent in time, 
accounts for Adorno’s enigmatic characterization of the work of art as where the 
possible future may be seen in the past. He writes:  
The reality of artworks testifies to the possibility of the possible. The object of 
art’s longing, the reality of what is not, is metamorphosed in art as 
remembrance. In remembrance what is qua what was combines with the non-
existing because what was no longer is. Ever since Plato’s doctrine of anamnesis 
the not-yet-existing has been dreamed of in remembrance, which alone 
concretizes utopia without betraying it to existence […] Yet art’s image is 
precisely what, according to Bergson’ and Proust’s thesis, seeks to awaken 
involuntary remembrance in the empirical, a thesis that process them to be 
genuine idealists. They attribute to reality what they want to save and what 
inheres in art only at the price of its reality. 122 
 
This complex citation goes to the heart of how the work of art engages in memory 
work by both giving the past a presence and by facilitating the interpretation of this 
presence. It also expresses the complexities of the work of art’s temporality. I will 
conclude this study by analyzing this citation. 
 
First, the remembrance of the not yet existing being dreamed and the possibility of the 
possible combined with the idea of Plato’s doctrine of anamnesis effects an interesting 
tension. For Plato, knowledge is imprinted on the soul, to learn is a sort of process of 
remembering what one already knows cumulatively.123 Taken analogously to the level 
of the city or the collective, an analytical process in which Plato engaged in dialogues 
such as The Republic, we can see that the past is present in the topography of the city 
as well as its institutions. Adorno would most likely agree on this point. However, the 
challenging thing about the notion of the not-yet-existing is both the yet and the 
possibility. For Adorno, because the work of art preserves and negates the past, and 
                                                
122 Adorno, Aesthetic Theory, 132. 
123 See example of the slave boy in Plato’s Meno, who knows geometry but never actually learned it. 
Plato, Five Dialogues, trans. G.M.A. Grube, (Indianapolis: Hackett Publishing Company Inc., 2002). 
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because the past is transcended through the work of art by its illumination of the 
present and interpretive potential, the possible and even likely future may be revealed. 
While Adorno is not attempting to imbue the work of art with an esoteric 
clairvoyance, unlike the souls in Plato’s doctrine who wake the happy words124already 
enciphered within them, Adorno’s critique wakes us to the possibility of the possible. We 
see the idea of the possibility of the possible manifest in Adorno’s concept of the present 
constituting the past,125 which, in turn is permeated by the past’s continuing objective 
conditions.126 The work of art’s dual temporality allows for the socio-historical 
moment to remain intact because of its immanent Zeitkern, and it permits the past’s 
transcendence in both utopian and dystopian possibilities by virtue of the 
interpretation process. This is the essential role of remembrance. It has to do with the 
past but not the past in a fixed and static way. Remembrance engages with the past as 
it is found within the institutions and images of the present. Remembrance then, is 
both aesthetic and political. 
 
However, the second point that needs clarification regarding temporality is the 
constant constitution and re-constitution of the past from the perspective of the 
present as well as the continuation of the past within the present is suggestive of a 
form of repetition. This relates to the Freudian aspect of Adorno’s work and it could 
be asked whether or not this continuation is similar to the repetition that is so 
important in psychoanalytic thought.127 Is the transcendence of art merely another 
                                                
124 See poem “The Last Class,” in Theodore Roethke, On Poetry & Craft, (Port Townsend, WA: Copper 
Canyon Press, 2001).  
125 See note 74. 
126 See notes 4 and 72. 
127 While Freud wrote about this a lot as it served as one of the foundational concepts of 
psychoanalysis, his 1914 essay “Remembering, Repeating, and Working-through” outlines his thoughts 
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incarnation of repetition? Is it a seeming eternal return of the same, or if not the same 
then the similar? 
 
I think that for Adorno, the memory work that is made possible by the work of art 
might be able to break this cycle. In order to respond this I would like to go back to 
the figure of Penelope. Adorno refers to Penelope’s weaving as the unconscious allegory of 
art.128 Even though it may appear as though we are trapped in an eternal return of 
weaving and unweaving, the possibility for intervention and newness still exists. 
Penelope is ultimately forced to finish the funeral shroud. Her final stalling technique, 
the bow stringing challenge is ultimately the way in which Odysseus, in disguise, 
announces his presence. This sets the scene for the riddle whose dissolution 
illuminates the entire work of art from standpoint of the moment in which the riddle 
is posed (the present constitutes the past): in establishing and reclaiming his identity, 
Odysseus claims his destiny to die on Ithaka’s rocky shore. However, looking at the 
example of Endgame, the question of whether or not the play can ever really end 
lingers after the curtain falls. Clov does leave. The effect of his departure is unknown 
as is whether or not there is anywhere for him to go. Nevertheless, his departure 
breaks the series of questions and answers, feedings, moving chairs around that 
constitute the course of the play. The questions of whether or not the shroud can 
actually be finished and what happens after the play finishes are at the heart of 
                                                
on working through trauma. See Sigmund Freud, “Remembering, Repeating and Working-Through,” 
in The Standard Edition of the Complete Works of Sigmund Freud Volume XII, trans. J. Strachey,  London: 
The Hogarth Press, 1958, pp. 147- 156. Adorno links Freud and Proust on the subject tof memory 
both in Notes to Literature Volume 2, 108, and when he writes about the smouldering collective unconscious in 
Critical Models, 96. For commentary on this and further connections between Freud and Adorno on the 
concept of remembering see Buck-Morss, Dreamworld and Catastrophe, 68-69, and The Origin of Negative 
Dialectics, 102-103.  
128 See Hullot-Kentor’s description of this in Things Beyond Resemblance, 43. 
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Adorno’s concept of memory. These are not questions that can be answered by the 
artists. Rather they can only be addressed during the aesthetic experience and the 
interpretation of artworks as posing social and historical questions in a way that 
‘denaturalizes’ them and debars them from being identified with the existing order. 
  
Returning to the citation that is being discussed at present, we may think of art’s images 
as dialectical images. The first two chapters of this study argued that works of art are 
dialectical images in which the past is preserved and negated and through which the 
past is transcended. Adorno states that these images awaken us both to the past and to 
the present by prompting involuntary memory. This involuntary memory both saves 
the past from oblivion but also interrupts the present. It exposes and renders visible 
the past within the present. For example, we find this notion in Adorno’s comment: 
“Art desires what has not yet been, though everything that art is has already been. It 
cannot escape the shadow of the past.”129 It seems on first glance as though the past 
both already was and will be. The reason for this lies in the possibility of the possible. 
However, as the riddle whose solution is not contained within the riddle, the future is 
not contained within the presence of the past even if its possibility and even perhaps its 
probability and likelihood may be read when interpreting the work. The interpretive 
findings express the condition of simultaneous possibility and constraint. The work of 
art is thus not only a cipher of the past, but also a cipher of the potential of what is to 
come, or rather what could come.  
 
                                                
129 Adorno, Aesthetic Theory, 134. 
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In any case, while the work of art cannot show us what is to come, it does 
retroactively show us what was coming before it arrived. Similar to philosophy’s 
tendency to arrive too late, for Adorno both art and the interpretation of art seem to 
happen too late. He writes that “Hegel’s dictum that the owl of Minerva begins its 
flight at dusk is confirmed in art.”130 Only in hindsight do we see the traces of what 
has been when it was in its ‘to come’ phase. As a means of illustrating this notion, 
Adorno gives the example of cubism anticipating “[…] the aerial photographs of 
bombed-out cities during World War II.”131 The idea of being too late is also present 
in The Odyssey: the suitors discover Penelope’s ruse too late, it is too late for the maids 
to explain their actions or atone for their crimes.  
 
I do, however, think that between the too late and the not-yet-existing, the work of 
art offers space. This space is that which is between the weaving and the unweaving, 
and in the moments where the maids kicked but not for long. Penelope stalls because 
she is hopeful as Odysseus could always return tomorrow. At one point, the possibility 
of his return tomorrow became an actuality of his return yesterday. The maids 
struggle but surely in their minds some intervention could have saved them as they 
struggled. Interestingly enough, the maids struggle takes place exactly between the 
possibility of tomorrow and actuality of yesterday. Regardless, in both instances there 
is a space. This space is the possibility of the possible and the sort of remembrance that is 
mediated by the work of art, according to Adorno, causes this space to be 
characterized with hope. Because the past transcends via the work of art, interpreting 
the work of art gives us clues to the past that is to come. It is for this reason that it is 
                                                
130 Ibid, 296. 
131 Ibid, 301. 
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right to characterize Adorno’s thinking with hope: there is still time and space to work 
through the past to stop it from happening again. While solving the Sphinx’s riddle 
with its embedded answer propels Oedipus into his unique destiny, it is only by 
remembering and venerating the secrets of the past that Odysseus is able to move his 
life forward.  
 
Returning to what I indicated in the introduction, for Adorno the past is present until 
its objective conditions are worked through. If these conditions are not worked 
through, and according to Adorno the conditions that led to the barbarism of the 20th 
century remained (and he would probably argue still remain) at large, then the work of 
art, and all dialectical images, offer a strange reading of history: they are ciphers of 
negative utopia, of the catastrophe to come. He calls them cryptograms of the new, 
but the new is in fact merely another incarnation of what already has been.132 In a 
sense, the work of art casts the shadow of the past into the future. It is not that the 
work of art predicts the future, but for Adorno, the truth that is revealed through the 
work of art by deciphering its Zeitkern pertains to what is to come. In terms of reading 
the possible future in the work of art, Adorno writes: “In the image of catastrophe, an 
image that is not a copy of the event but the cipher of its potential, the magical trace 
of art’s most distant pre-history reappears under the total spell, as if art wanted to 
prevent the catastrophe by conjuring up its image.”133  
 
                                                
132 Adorno links the idea of cryptogram of past/new with image of collapse. See Adorno, Aesthetic 
Theory, 32-33. For another example see Adorno’s description of Kierkegaard’s concept of the work of 
art’s temporality as posthumous: “If the history of sinful nature is that of the collapse of its unity, it 
moves toward reconciliation even while collapsing, and its fragments bear the fissures of collapse as 
propitious ciphers.” Adorno, Kierkegaard, 139. 
133 Adorno, Aesthetic Theory, 33.  
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The strange temporality of the work of art, as a cipher of the new in the old, 
expresses a temporal presence. When sealed in the work of art and read as a cipher of 
what is to come, the past appears to present itself simultaneously as part of an eternal 
return and as something that is frozen and always the same. This temporal concept of 
the artwork fits in with other notions of temporality contemporaneous to Adorno 
such as can be found in Benjamin’s Theses on the Philosophy of History.134 The complex 
temporality of presence results in the call to decipher the work of art’s truth content. 
Deciphering this truth content is a philosophical task, the kind Zizek calls a sort of 
philosophical detective work.135 Zizek, interpreting Hegel, claims that the authentic 
work of art re-writes the history of art, and that the contingent becomes necessary 
after the fact. A similar notion is at work in Adorno’s theories of the work of art and 
it comes into play when thinking about memory: By looking at the traces of history in 
the work of art, the philosophical detective is able to predict (and theoretically to 

















                                                
134 See Benjamin, “Theses on the Philosophy of History,” in Illuminations. 
135Ziziek quotes Chesterton and identifies policemen who go to books and anticipate crimes that will be 
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